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Abstract 
 
University : The American University in Cairo 
Thesis Title : Conditional Cash Transfer in Egypt: The need for proper financial and 
administrative controls 
Name  : Ahmed Fathy Badawy 
Advisors : Jennifer Bremer, Ph.D.; Hamid Ali, Ph.D.; and Ghada Barsoum, Ph.D. 
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs, as one of the most efficient social protection 
programs, use large amount of public resources. Such programs are prone to leakage of public 
resources due to risks from error, fraud, and corruption. Countries in Latin America have 
implemented CCT programs since the early 1980‘s and they have experienced leakages from 
error, fraud, and corruption (EFC) which requires use of mechanisms and a control system to 
tackle the risks of EFC. These mechanisms have been introduced in the World Bank toolkit on 
tackling error, fraud, and corruption. The recommended strategies to mitigate EFC address risks 
through three main strategies: prevention, detection strategies, and deterrence. 
This study answers the main research question of what guidance does Egyptian and 
global experience provide as to what constitutes a proper control system for the implementation 
of conditional cash transfer programs to prevent error, fraud, and corruption? It provides a vision 
of what proper controls could be useful for implementing CCT in Egypt and other countries that 
share similar characteristics. 
This broader perspective of protection mechanisms has been investigated through 
contacting global experts from different countries and local social inspectors who worked in the 
pilot project in Egypt. This combination takes advantage of global and local experiences 
recommend what could enable Egypt to have a proper control system to reduce EFC.  
The study findings demonstrate that Egypt can apply proper administration and financial 
controls in its CCT program at each of its three main stages: eligibility, compliance, and cash 
disbursing. Recommended control mechanisms are developed around three building blocks of 
prevention; detection; and deterrence. Other recommendations are provided for CCT program in 
Egypt regarding interministerial cooperation, the required political support to CCT for program 
success, use of computerized systems in the verification processes, and a reconsideration of 
economic, political, and administrative challenges to CCT programs in Egypt.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Social protection programs usually consume large amount of public resources. Egypt, for 
the last five decades, adopted in-kind subsidies as its primary approach to alleviate poverty and 
move toward economic stability.  In its way to do that , Egypt perform phases of economic and 
social reform vary from the Egyptian government temptation to provide social economic model 
during Nasser‘s era to the liberalization of Egypt economy and cut subsidies during Sadat‘s era. 
Since 1991, subsidy policy has been partially reformed, and the Egyptian government even 
eliminates subsidies on many products. Currently, only basic foods, energy, transport and 
medicines are still subsidized by the government. In recent years the government has strategized 
to address the gradual reduction of subsidies primarily on basic food items and energy provision 
with medical services not considered a priority for liberalization.  
The most recent controversy in regard to the restructuring plans for food subsidies is the 
transformation from the country‘s ‗in-kind‘ system to a cash payment system that would directly 
target those in Egypt that need it most. Since 2006, use of a ―smart card‖ to manage some 
subsidized food distribution has been instituted and now covers 19 governorates. The concept 
behind this is to monitor and identify where cash welfare payments need to go and minimize the 
abuse of food subsidies, leakage to black markets, and maybe rationalize the use of other 
services provided in the future such as health insurance, transportation, and pension.  
The immediate problem of this program is that the government will have difficulty 
reaching every citizen in need of subsidies as there is a severe lack of information on Egypt‘s 
low income groups. At the same time both the government and public fear that transformation to 
a cash payment system will result in a high rate of inflation (Egypt: government initiatives for 
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subsidy reform, 2010). The source of fears may be coming from that the cash payment would not 
keep up with inflation, whereas amount of cash is constant while goods prices moving upward.  
The international community realizes the large needs for a mechanism that provide a social 
protection programs to the poor. Consequently, starts to focus on more effective and efficient 
social safety nets and in 2005 began to explore implementing the conditional cash transfer in 
Egypt.  
As the name implies, conditional cash transfers (CCT) provide cash transferred to poor 
families, conditional on fulfilling a set of requirements that aim to create investments in human 
capital, such as sending their children to school and making health checkups at health centers. 
This program has been implemented successfully in different countries especially in Latin 
America and it proves its ability to achieve short-run goals in improving health, educational, and 
food nutrition in various countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and other countries around 
the world.  The context in which it has been applied differs from one country to another. 
The success of the program implementation depends on the country administration 
capacity, and the program effectiveness depends on existence of strong financial controls and 
accountability mechanisms, which are critical to maximizing the expected outputs and targeting 
the human development as per the program design. This research assesses CCT system controls 
from administrative and financial perspectives in order to evaluate its ability to mitigate risks of 
errors, fraud, and corruption. 
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CHAPTER ONE: Statement of Problem and Study Rationale 
  
Challenges that have been facing Egypt in its way to implement CCT program: 
Although Egypt has tried out over recent decades several different social protection 
programs to improve the social status for poor families, most of those programs failed to get the 
poor out of poverty. The new trend around the world to implement conditional cash transfer 
comes as a result of the finding that these programs demonstrate ability to improve the health, 
education, and economic conditions of poor families. The cash transfer programs that have been 
growing most rapidly across the developing world over the last decade or so are CCTs, by which 
cash is paid to poor households on condition that they invest (in certain pre-specified ways) in 
the human capital of their children. 
 
The challenges to implementation of social protection programs include leakage of public 
resources either because of market and/or administrative failures to allocate the resources to the 
intended beneficiaries. It is imperative to put in place tools and mechanisms that guarantee the 
efficient use of public resources to serve a large clientele. This research is trying to answer the 
questions:  what could be proper controls and accountability in the implementation of conditional 
cash transfer in Egypt and what lessons could Egypt learn from other countries. To that end, the 
research looked at what the standard mechanisms that were implemented successfully in other 
countries‘ experiments. 
 
CCTs in Egypt must be implemented in a way that responds to Egypt‘s realities, which 
may briefly be characterized as follows: 
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Overall about 44.4% of the Egyptian populations are in the range of extreme poor to near poor: 
(The World Bank, 2007) 
 
• 21% of the Egyptian population was near poor, meaning that about 14.6 million Egyptians can 
obtain their basic food requirements in addition to some basic services. 
• 19.6% of the Egyptian population was poor, meaning that about 13.6 million Egyptians (one 
out of every five) had consumption expenditure below the poverty line and could not therefore 
obtain their basic food and non-food needs.  
• 3.8% of the Egyptian population was extreme poor, meaning that about 2.6 million of the 
Egyptian poor could not obtain their basic food requirements even if they spent all their 
expenditure on food. 
 
Poverty has a strong regional dimension in Egypt and concentrates in Upper Egypt 
region, both urban (18.6%) and rural (39.1%), while metropolitan areas are the least poor (5.7%). 
The government is currently employing recently completed poverty map as tool for geographic 
targeting of public resources. 
 
That is why the Egyptian government over the past five decades has been trying to target 
the poor and alleviate poverty especially in Upper Egypt. The Egyptian government applied 
different methodologies to subsidize the poor and made different reforms (these will be covered 
in the literature review of this research), until it has been decided to implement CCT programs in 
Egypt.  This effort has begun with a pilot project at a small scale in Ain El-Serra (a Cairo 
district) and a second, larger pilot project in Upper Egypt.  
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The implementation of CCT programs presents a large number of challenges. Although 
CCT was implemented successfully in different countries especially in Latin America and has 
proven its ability in achieving the short-run goals in improving health, educational, and food 
nutrition in various countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile and other countries around the world, 
the context in which it has been applied differs from one country to another. As well, it includes 
large number of payments to poor families.  
 
In Egypt, the program responsibilities are shared amongst various ministries, 
governmental units and departments within the country and multiple international organizations. 
Implementing a large project like the conditional cash transfer in Egypt needs a set of controls to 
prevent the program from leakages due to error, fraud, and corruption. Egypt suffered from the 
leakage of resources because of the poor targeting that is combined with system leakage such 
that only one third of the existing subsidy goes to the needy. Consequently, their implementation 
depends on country systems and its effectiveness depends on having sufficient planning, 
existence of strong financial controls and accountability mechanisms— and the continuous 
efforts to strengthen them as needed— which is critical to maximize the expected outputs and to 
target the human development as per the program design. Implementing CCT in Egypt without 
adequate controls on EFC will make the program more vulnerable to risks of fraud and 
corruption. To avoid the risks of EFC, there should be mitigation strategies and controls in CCT 
programs. These controls start at all stages in the program through the introduction of tighter 
checks and safeguards.  
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In the following section, three questions will be answered: 
 What are the risks of Error, Fraud, and Corruption that interfere 
in the implementation of CCT programs? 
 What do pilot and international experiences tell us about 
effective mechanisms in place to control EFC? 
 How and whether such experiences could be applied within 
Egypt context? 
 
What are the risks of Error, Fraud, and Corruption that interfere in the implementation of 
CCT programs? 
Figure 1:  Typology of fraud and error in benefit systems 
 
Source: RAND Europe 
` 
           Page 16 
 
According to the (The World Bank, 2007)‖; the causes of this leakage can be defined as follows: 
 Error is the unintentional violation of program or benefit rules, 
resulting in the wrong benefit amount or payments to an 
ineligible applicant. One can distinguish between official error 
due to staff mistakes, and customer error which occurs when a 
customer inadvertently provides incorrect information. 
 Fraud occurs when a claimant deliberately makes a false 
statement, conceals or distorts relevant information regarding 
program eligibility or level of benefits. 
 Corruption commonly involves manipulation of beneficiary 
rosters (e.g. registering potential beneficiaries for clientelistic 
purposes to garner political support); staff accepting illegal 
payments from legal or illegal beneficiaries; or diversion of 
funds to ghost or illegal channels. 
 
Error, Fraud, and Corruption represent causes of the leakage of the CCT programs 
resources. Although there is no system immune from EFC, there are examples from developed 
countries showing the capability to reduce such leakage to acceptable levels. The leakages here 
mean that the resources are not transferred to the right beneficiaries, in the right amount, and in 
the right time.  
―We do care about the EFC in social protection programs because even a small fraction 
of leakages of resources could be presented in a large amount of resources.‖  (The World Bank, 
2007): On average, social protection (SP) spending represents 15.7% of GDP in developed 
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countries, 7.4% in middle-income countries (MICs) and 3.8% in low-income countries (LICs). 
The information from developing countries is scarcer, as only few programs and countries have 
taken measures to combat and/or measure the incidence of EFC. However, it is plausible to 
expect the share of funds affected by EFC be larger compared to developed countries. For 
example, in India a Government audit in 2003 found that 31.6% of Indira Awaas Yojana (IAY) 
(housing programs) and 53.5% of Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY) (welfare 
program) funds did not reach the intended beneficiaries. In the case of the Sampoorna Grameen 
Rozgar Yojana (SGRY ) (rural employment and food security initiative; India), an employment 
program, administrative data report that 31.3 million man-days of work were generated in 2001-
02, while the National Sample Survey data for 2002-03 estimate this number as less than 3 
million man-days, only 10% of the official figure. 
 
What pilot experiences tell us about effective mechanisms in place to control EFC? 
There are many developing and even developed countries around the world that have 
implemented the conditioning cash transfer; since the mid-1990‘s demand side programs linking 
cash to behavior have been widely adopted across a range of countries (Aber and Rawlings, 
2011). According to the World Bank review of the control and accountability mechanisms in 
CCT programs in Latin America and Caribbean;   it has noted positively that all programs 
incorporate several accountability mechanisms, which can be reinforced by reviewing 
institutional arrangements with attention to incentives, clarity of roles, and potential conflicts of 
interest. The Review also noted the importance of continued strengthening of quality control—in 
particular, feedback loops to enable continuous correction (The World Bank-Latin America and 
Caribbean Region, 2007)  
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The World Bank review provided the following facts that should be recognized: 
 While comparisons are limited by differences in benefits and 
measurement standards, fraud and error rates in income support 
programs in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States 
generally range between 3.5 to 5.3 percent (UK National Audit 
Office, 2006). 
 Adequate program accountability and control depend on a wide 
range of factors and mechanisms, as well as on crosschecks and 
feedback mechanisms among the related elements. 
 These programs are not isolated within their respective 
countries‘ social policies, as they reflect the character of overall 
governance at the national level. The risk assessment for any 
program depends on its particular characteristics and national 
context; and any recommendation needs to factor in the costs 
and benefits of additional control activities. 
 Finally, the external experts advised that definitions of 
―irregularity‖ must be considered carefully. It is important to 
distinguish between fraud and other kinds of problem, such as 
missing paperwork, administrative mistakes, MIS errors, and 
weak service quality. 
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The World Bank recommendations on control mechanisms that could be applied in Latin 
America and Caribbean countries 
In light of the control and accountability mechanisms that was recommended by the 
World Bank to Latin America and Caribbean; a number of main recommendations could be 
applied most broadly to CCT programs including Egypt are: 
 Institutional design. Provide polices that clearly defining the 
intergovernmental relationship between governmental units. 
This should cover the administration and service performance 
and alignment of incentives to good performer or penalties to 
whom not performing well. 
 Targeting and eligibility. More efforts should be directed to 
possible exclusion errors (that is, eligible households not being 
included) and consider the need for more frequent 
recertification of eligibility. 
 Conditionalities. Verifying the compliance to the conditionality 
is a heavy burden on the implementation of CCT, that‘s why a 
balance between accuracy and verification is highly required. 
 Payment processes. Methods of cash-flow and monitoring how 
it is paid are an integral part in CCT monitoring and associated 
control procedures. 
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 Internal quality control. Expand process evaluation, feedback 
loops, and correction mechanisms within programs, particularly 
through spot checks. 
 Accountability. Ensure appropriate mechanisms to handle 
complaints and appeals in a timely manner, and publish 
program data. 
 Financial management and auditing. Define payment 
accounting and reporting requirements. 
 Focus audits on risks. Include supreme audit institutions. 
 
Topic: 
This study examines the implementing of planning and accountability controls on the 
conditional cash transfer in Egypt. This research is investigating what should the measures be, 
based on the pilot experience and global experiences, to have necessary but not sufficient 
effective mechanisms in place to control Error, Fraud, and Corruption (EFC) at the three main 
points of eligibility determination, compliance verification, and cash distribution. By having 
adequate controls and mechanism of clear determination of accountability and responsibility 
amongst different parties within the CCT program processes, and a system to work on Error, 
Fraud, and Corruption; we may achieve the desired goals of CCT with minimum loss of 
resources.   
  
` 
           Page 21 
 
Importance of topic:  
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) Programs are adopted in different countries around the 
world; it targets the poor and becomes one of the most effective tools to alleviate poverty and 
provide mechanisms to build human capital among future generations.  It creates an investment 
in human capital through creation of contractual agreement with poor families. This relationship 
set a partnership between poor families and government which was not known before in 
developing countries. Another important aspect is the CCT objective to break the 
intergenerational transmission of poverty.  Studies of CCT programs have proven that these 
programs can be well targeted, reduce the poverty of the poorest households, and improve 
children‘s education and health status. 
According to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) set by the United Nations (UN) 
―The UN Summit on the Millennium Development Goals concluded with the adoption of a 
global action plan to achieve the eight anti-poverty goals by their 2015 target date and the 
announcement of major new commitments for women's and children's health and other initiatives 
against poverty, hunger and disease‖ (United Nations, 2010). The international community 
realizes the large needs for a mechanism that provide a social protection programs to the poor. 
The MDG is seeking to provide rights to the poor in the fields of food and nutrition, education, 
health, and women empowerment and equality. Many conferences and researches pays attention 
to the impact of conditional cash transfer as a tool for social protection, its strengths and 
weaknesses, and the way it impacted the communities and families dynamics.  
Since Egypt is part of the International community, it started to focus on more effective and 
efficient social safety nets, the Egyptian government requested the World Bank in 2005 to 
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prepare a report on improving the system of in-kind subsidies and social safety nets. This request 
generated as part of the Egyptian government efforts to enhance its ability to provide the services 
to the poor. The World Bank report found that, ―despite high and increased levels of social 
spending, poverty in Egypt continues to be relatively high….the existing in-kind subsidy 
programs – which form the basis of the current safety net - are costly, ineffective, create market 
distortions and inefficiencies, and that benefit the rich far more than the poor‖ and recommended 
that‖ the poor would benefit from a strengthening of the social safety net along the following 
lines:  
 A significant expansion in the cash-assistance program to raise 
the benefit levels and expand the coverage 
  Enriching the safety net with better targeting methods like 
proxy-means testing and greater use of geographic targeting in 
order to direct a substantial fraction of public resources to the 
intended beneficiaries, while minimizing the leakage to the 
wealthy 
 The introduction of a conditional-cash transfer program that 
helps the poor enhance their human capital,  
  The introduction of a workfare program at very low wages that 
provide temporary jobs for the able-bodied poor ― (The World 
Bank, 2005)  
Although the Egyptian Government (EG) may not be able to shift into the cash assistance 
programs and replace the in-kind subsidy in short run, the conditioned cash transfer is a 
challenge for the Egyptian government as it needs more controls than in-kind programs.  
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Partially the success of the program in previous experiments, especially in Latin America‘s 
countries, showed that a large percentage of its ability to succeed relies on the quality of the 
government from the administrative perspectives and the financial and audit controls performed 
to guarantee that the program is moving toward the targets for which the program is designed.  
According to the Anti Corruption Resource Center (ACRC, April 2010) report on corruption 
prevention strategies in cash transfer schemes; the absence of a systematic evaluation of the 
effects of CT on corruption, there is no conclusive evidence that these are more prone to 
corruption than payments in-kind (Marie, 2010).    
Research questions 
 
This study is going to provide an answer to the research question/s: 
Main Question: 
 What guidance does Egyptian and global experience provide as 
to what constitutes a proper control system for the 
implementation of conditional cash transfer program to prevent 
error, fraud, and corruption? Answering the following sub-
questions will provide answer to the main question 
Sub-Questions 
 What are the administrative systems that would comprise a good 
implementation of conditional cash transfer in Egypt? 
 Eligibility 
 Compliance (met the eligibility) 
 What are the financial and control systems that would maximize 
and provide the best basis of conditional cash transfer in Egypt? 
 Cash disbursement   
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CHAPTER TWO: Literature Review 
 
This section covers the following points: 
  Overview of social protection programs applied in Egypt. 
 Subsidization of commodities and services to support 
low-income brackets 
 Social Security …Pension for those without a pension 
 Egypt CCT pilots: Funding and Partnership 
 Why Conditional Cash Transfer may be appropriate for Egypt 
 Aspects of failure of the in-kind 
 Aspects of success of conditional cash transfer 
 Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) characteristics and global 
experience 
 Egypt context 
 Challenges facing conditional cash transfer 
 
Overview of social protection programs applied in Egypt. 
 
The Egyptian Social Security system basically relies on contributions by the government to 
support the poor. These contributions or subsidies took different forms in order to enhance the 
Egyptian social equity and to support the ability of Egypt‘s poor to balance between their low 
income and the increase in the cost of life. The forms of subsidization are many, some of which 
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are the subsidy of commodities including food basic items which known as in-kind subsidy and 
subsidization of medical services.   
 
1. Subsidization of commodities and Services to support Low-Income Brackets: 
Subsidization is one of the most essential tools for the Egyptian government to provide the 
commodities to the poor with reasonable and affordable prices. Started since the World War II 
and continue until present. In December 2005, a new ministry of social solidarity was 
established, taking the competences of supply and social affairs ministries; while social 
insurance affairs became under the competency of the Ministry of Finance 
 
According to Egypt State of Information Services Year Book (2009)  
 
 The percentage of subsidization against the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 
increased by a ratio of .2% from 2004-2005-  9%  to 2008-2009 – 9.2% 
 The per capita share of subsidization was doubled during the period 2004-2005, 2008-
2009 to reach about EGP 1275 in 2008-2009 against EGP 686.5 in 2004-2005. 
   The value of commodities and services subsidization in 2008-2009 reached about EGP 
94 billion, of which EGP 21 billion went to supplies commodities, EGP 63 billion for 
petroleum products and EGP 10 billion for other programs such as housing and 
transportation 
 Subsidy for supply commodities increased by 28% to reach EGP 21 billion  in 2008-2009  
against EGP 16.4 billion in 2007-2008. 
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In contrast to the CCT, subsidies are working from the supply side by the government 
without any action needs to be taken by the demand side which is the poor people. This approach 
is working in one direction which is to provide the poor with food items.  It does not provide a 
mechanism on how to alleviate their living standards and transfer them from passive recipients of 
assistance to partners with the government in improving their condition. Under CCT programs 
the partnership will work for increase their living standards and break the poverty 
intergenerational cycle in the society. 
 
2. Social Security …Pension for those without a pension: 
―The Ministerial Decree No 140 of 2005 stipulates that the minimum of social security 
pension shall be LE 60 monthly for one person, and gradually increase to LE 80 in view of 
number of family members, as of 1/7/2005. At that time, the number of beneficiaries hit 1 
million families, with a total cost of LE 1 billion per annum. In addition, each family, benefiting 
from the social security pension, receives a monthly grant of LE 20 for each child enrolled in 
basic education during the academic year for 8 months as of 1/10/2005. In case of many basic 
education enrolled-children within the same family, each receives the grant with a maximum of 
LE 100. Social security system regulates the provision of the following services: 
 monthly aid 
 one-package aid 
 assistance to retired employees 
 relief aid 
 Children Pension, benefiting about 53,000 children, with an annual credit of LE 20 
million by average EGP 31 / Month‖ (Egypt State Information System, 2009).  
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Box 1: Subsidies and social safety net 
According to World Bank  (2006) 
What is the Public Social Safety Net? 
The public social safety net generally refers to the set of publicly-sponsored programs that provide 
income or in-kind support and access to basic social services to the poorest and most vulnerable in 
society. They are distinct from other forms of social protection including contributory social 
insurance such as pensions, as well as labor market regulations and interventions. 
Typical programs in many countries include: 
● Cash transfers (also known as social assistance) such as family assistance, noncontributory old age 
transfers or disability payments; 
● In-kind transfers such as food rations and nutrition and feeding programs,;  
● Price and tax subsidies for the poor; 
● Targeted human-development programs/conditional cash transfers; 
● Public workfare; 
● Fee waivers for health, education or other basic services.  
Egypt spends about 2 percent of its GDP on the core social safety net. It does not have every type of 
program above, but resources are devoted to : 
● Consumer subsidies on food (1.7 percent of GDP); 
● SFD programs (0.18 percent of GDP); and 
● Social assistance cash transfers from MOISA (0.12 percent of GDP). 
The largest share of resources, 8.1 percent of GDP, is spent on energy subsidies to producers and 
consumers which serve as an important safety net but also absorb resources that could be better 
directed to the poor. 
Sources: MOISA, SFD, and other GOE officials. 
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According to  (UNDP, 2010)
 ‗ The cash transfers, through social-solidarity-pension scheme, 
currently covers more than one million poor households with a total cost in excess of EGP one 
billion. The target is to double the number of households covered by this scheme within the year 
2010/2011 at a total cost of EGP 1.6 billion allocated for this goal in the proposed budget. 
Another EGP 5 billion is, allocated within the 2009/10 budget for miscellaneous social 
assistances, aside from what the public budget allocates on an annual basis, as a government 
share 
 
There are other organizations and institutions working to provide social assistance to the poor. A 
number of donors, notably UNICEF, WFP, UNDP  played key technical roles in the 
establishment of CCT program in the country creating the perception that the program was  
donor driven and that its effort in partnership with government. Those international organizations 
support the CCT program from technical perspectives such as design of the program and 
providing consultation to the program team rather than financing the program which is fully 
financed by the government that shouldered the whole bulk of required resources.  
 
Some of those institutions, organizations, and banking are as follows: 
 Nasser Social Bank was established pursuant to Law No. 66 of 1971 with the aim of 
expanding the social solidarity base through granting soft loans and aid for low-income 
brackets. The bank is providing social assistance to the poor who do not have sources of 
income (divorced, widows, handicapped). 
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 There is also a social pension for non-contributive monthly benefit paid on a means-
tested basis to the elderly poor aged 65 and over. These people fall outside  the irregular 
employee and other pensions 
 
3. Egypt CCT : Funding and Partnership 
According to the operation manual of CCT in Upper Egypt (Sholakamy, Piloting CCT in 
Egypt, 2010), the budget for the conditional cash transfer program consists of two distinct parts. 
Firstly, the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MOSS) as the implementing agency is responsible for 
the budget and the payment of the transfers to families and for providing the social workers in 
order to implement the program. For its part, the Social Research Center (SRC) is fundraising to 
cover the research, monitoring and evaluation portion of the budget. Currently, the SRC has 
fundraised to cover the expenses until December 2010 and is continuing its efforts to ensure 
financing until the end of the two-year experiment. 
The donors financing SRC activities within the Upper Egypt CCT include the Ford 
Foundation, UNDP Egypt and UNICEF Egypt. 
UNICEF funds support the following activities:  
 Support for the design of a child well-being component (health and education), 
 Documentation of the process of design, experiment set up, training and initial 
implementation, 
 Baseline results dissemination (workshops, conferences) 
 Technical support provided to the Ministry of Social Solidarity. 
UNDP grant provided to the MOSS will ensure the technical assistance of the SRC in the Upper 
Egypt pilot in the following areas: 
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 Training of social workers on CCT and building their capacity to work in the community 
and to participate in research. 
 Designing the CCT package in accordance with the needs and resources of the villages 
and the region of Upper Egypt. 
 Conceptualizing and implementing the experiment in a rigorous manner. 
 Production of information packages, baseline, monitoring and self-monitoring tools and 
instruments that will enable the MOSS to implement the program. 
 Research the impact of the CCT on individuals, families and communities using 
qualitative and quantitative methods. 
UNDP is also exerting efforts to fight poverty in Egypt and it takes the initiative  for a better 
understanding of how market-based approaches to human development can ‗do good‘ for people 
living in poverty while also being good for business. It is founded on the premise that ―inclusive 
markets‖ that offer the poor access to basic goods and services and empower them economically 
as consumers and producers can help lift them out of poverty. (UNDP, 2007)  
A partnership with IPC-IG/UNDP Brazil has been formalized in order to provide 
econometric and statistical support to the design, randomization and evaluation components of 
the pilot. Furthermore, the SRC is actively seeking partnerships with other organizations and 
individuals working in Upper Egypt. Areas that need to be covered by potential partners include 
change in rural food markets and inflation (food, schooling, etc.).  
Currently, discussions of support are ongoing with World Food Program (WFP) for 
qualitative and quantitative evaluation as well as markets surveillance.  
It is concluded (SRC, 2010) that the current social security system is not covering the whole 
poor families within the society. To get such assistance, poor families should follow number of 
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governmental procedures in order to prove the financial assistance conditions set by the 
government are met in their cases. One of these procedures is to have official documentation 
(birth certificate, social research by social workers to investigate their status of eligibility) 
 
The following chart shows some of the currently exist social protection systems in the Egyptian: 
Figure 2: Social protection systems in the Egyptian 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source (The World Bank, 2005): EGYPT - TOWARD A MORE EFFECTIVE SOCIAL POLICY: SUBSIDIES AND SOCIAL 
SAFETY NET 
The Poor 
 Energy Subsidy= 8.1 
% of GDP – FY04 
 Electricity subsidy = 
.2% of GDP- FY 04 
 
Housing 
Not available 
In-Kind 
 Food Subsidies = 1.7 % of GDP –FY04 
 Baladi bread=1.3 %  of GDP 
 Ration Card Goods B = .4%  of 
GDP 
 Safety Net  = .3 % of GDP – FY 04 
 Cash Transfer = .1 %  
 Social Development Fund = .2%  
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The social safety net in Egypt has a wide range of social provisions. Although the 
majority of workers are covered, there are gaps for casual and informal workers. The Egyptian 
government was using the in-kind transfer as one of the means to achieve the social justice 
during the past decades, however from the economic efficiency perspectives it has been 
experienced that the in-kind transfers was not successful to target the poor and work to alleviate 
the level of poverty amongst the poor and it could not break the intergenerational poverty in 
Egypt. 
Why conditional cash transfer in Egypt? (Failure and Success) 
 
1. Aspects of failure of the in-kind support  
The failure of the in-kind comes from different aspects some of which are ―When 
policymakers intervene to set prices that are different from the marginal social benefit or 
marginal social cost, as occurs in the case of in-kind transfer schemes, resources will be used 
inefficiently‖ (Blackorby, 1998). The intention of any government from in-kind transfer is to let 
people consume more than they would under market determined prices, however the inefficiency 
cited in the previous statement means that in-kind transfers are ill-suited in conditions of 
resource scarcity to give the maximum benefit from using these resources.   
 
Another aspect is that in-kind transfer not only affects subsidized good prices but also 
influences the market price of nonsubsidized goods. This happens when producer of subsidized 
goods gain because they get the subsidized goods by lower prices from household and other 
nonsubsidized goods prices can‘t compete because it is not profitable enough for traders when 
compared to trading of subsidized goods in black-markets. Finally, and from a control 
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perspective the in-kind transfer failed to target only the poor (Eligibility) and the subsidy goes to 
both poor and non-poor families which influence the effectiveness of in-kind transfer programs. 
This occurred because the in-kind transfer programs did not have adequate controls and 
procedure to guarantee that only the poor families , will benefit from the program, assuming that 
it is directed to the poor only rather than the whole population,.  
 
In-kind transfer led to an excess burden on taxpayers because the cost of the subsidy is 
greater than the value of the benefit received by the transfer recipient‖ (Raghbendra, 1995). This 
is known economically as deadweight loss where the cost paid by the funders, usually taxpayers, 
for in-kind subsidy, exceeds the benefits (going to the poor).
 
The traditional social insurance 
programs received many critics that everyone can benefit from current subsidy system and 
because it lacks adequate monitoring, most of it goes to non-poor. On the other hand we can see 
that CCT experiments ensured that most of those who need assistance actually receive it.    
2. Aspects of success of conditional cash transfer  
Based on similarly disappointing outcomes from in-kind subsidy schemes elsewhere, 
alternative poverty alleviation programs emerged, notably ―Conditional Cash Transfer‖ (CCT). 
According to the World Bank, "Conditional cash transfers provide money directly to poor 
families via a ―social contract‖ with the beneficiaries – for example, sending children to school 
regularly or bringing them to health centers. For extremely poor families, cash provides 
emergency assistance, while the conditionalities promote longer-term investments in human 
capital." (Nigenda, 2005)  
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs are increasingly perceived as an effective tool 
for poverty alleviation. CCT programs have been highly successful in Latin American countries, 
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and are increasingly perceived as a ―magic bullet‖ for poverty reduction, according to the World 
Bank. 
The Implementation of cash transfers in both developed and developing countries showed 
successful experiments especially that most of the traditional social insurance programs have 
failed to reduce poverty.   Conditional cash transfer (CCT), placed itself as an important tool in 
the social safety nets because it started with the initiation to ―provide recipients with greater 
freedom of choice and give recipients a higher level of satisfaction at any given level of income 
than is the case with in-kind transfers‖ (Hyman, 1999)   
.  
Well-known programs that follow this approach include (Opportunities) in Mexico, Bolsa 
Escola(School Allowance welfare program) and Bolsa Familia (Family allowance welfare 
program) in Brazil, Red Protection Social program in Nicaragua, Program for Assisting Poor 
Families in Honduras, Program of Advancement through Health and Education in Jamaica, 
Food-for-Education (FFE) in Bangladesh, and Subsidio Unico Familiar (Subsidize Poor 
Families) in Chile (de Janvry and Sadoulet 2006) . Most of these programs prove ability to break 
the intergenerational poverty and helps in increasing number of children educated and enhancing 
the health conditions of poor families. 
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Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) Characteristics 
 
 Conditional Cash Transfers: a Global Perspective 
 
The transfer is a resource that allows families to access health and educational services at 
less of a burden.  Although CCT programs are controversial in terms of the necessity of 
conditions and their efficacy in impacting some aspects of poverty, they have largely shown to 
be successful in alleviating health and education burdens, and since the 1990s, have been applied 
in dozens of countries around the world (Lagarde, 2007).  CCT programs are suitable for middle-
income countries with expansive infrastructure, like Egypt, due to the conditionalities requiring 
families to access health and educational services.  Additionally, CCTs can be adjusted to fit the 
context in which they are applied: by changing targeting mechanisms, amounts transferred 
conditions, or method of transfer.   
Several characteristics for the implementation of CCT generate benefits beyond those 
available in simple subsidy programs.  First CCT programs target the poor and address gender 
bias, since the transfer usually goes to the female heading the family
1.
 Second, it builds human 
capital by requiring school attendance, food nutrition, and health checkups. Third, the level of 
cash transferred varies with the size of the family, number of children and their age and gender.  
For example, the amount of cash to secondary student may be greater than those for primary 
school because adolescent children are expected to have higher opportunity cost of attending 
school, particularly for poor families.  
                                                             
 
1 For instance, Brazil‘s Bolsa Escola transferred monthly payments to poor households with children aged 6–
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Most of the literature on CCT pointed out that in order to apply the conditionality on the 
cash and guarantee positive application of CCT, it is essential to ensure that the supply of social 
services for education and health is enough and able to match the demand of the beneficiaries. 
The prerequisites of implementing a successful CCT could be reconciled by providing schools, 
hospitals, teachers, medical staff, management information system, and banking system and 
postal offices. 
 
  According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2008), the success of CCT programs 
in some countries is no guarantee that they can be reproduced in others with the same 
performance. For instance, in many developing countries, children, particularly in rural areas, 
face supply-related problems, i.e., there are not enough schools, classrooms, or teachers to offer 
adequate education to those who need or want them. In such circumstances, pouring resources 
into a CCT program may not be able to achieve the educational objective. Thus, in low-income 
countries with limited social service infrastructure, CCT programs should integrate demand-side 
with supply-side issues in order to avoid policy inconsistency and resource wastage (Hyun, 
2008)
. 
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Egypt from piloting to large scale implementation of CCT 
In this section the study discusses the experience with CCT in Egypt, including: 
 Egypt from piloting to scale up implementation of CCT 
         The Egyptian government through implementation of different social policies and 
economic reforms has tried to achieve social justice and fighting the poverty. After the 
successful implementation of CCT programs in different countries around the world, Egyptian 
government represented by MOSS and MOF in cooperation with SRC decided to go through 
CCT experiment beside the other current social policies and programs in order to share its 
fruitful results.   Experiments with conditional cash transfer program are being implemented in 
a slum in Cairo. The pilot program in the district of Ain El-Serra, under the administration of 
the Ministry of Social Solidarity aims at empowering women and alleviating poverty in one of 
the poorest areas within greater Cairo. SRC took initiative step and get an approval from the 
minister of social solidarity in Egypt, to apply a pilot study in partnership with the ministry.  
 
The objective of the initial pilot project is to demonstrate a new approach that could shift 
social policies addressing urban poverty in Egypt to a more effective assistance model.  
Successful completion of the project may mark a departure from the existing government 
subsidy system to a comprehensive package that aims to empower families and break the cycle 
of dependency and poverty through improving their capabilities for self-reliance. In this strategy, 
conditional cash-transfers allow families to meet their basic needs but greater emphasis is placed 
on training and services offered by experienced mentors, advocates and specialists to identify 
and eliminate the root causes which sustain poverty. After completing its piloting project, SRC 
and MOSS prepared different studies and analysis in order to evaluate this experiment and to 
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plan for another large scale project in Egypt, targeting more poor families in the poorest villages, 
in Upper Egypt (Sholakamy, Piloting CCT in Egypt, 2010) 
 Ain El-Serra Experiment2 of Egypt, 2010: 
The Egyptian CCT Pilot is being applied in two stages: in the urban slum of Ain El-Serra, 
located in Cairo and in the governorates of Assiut and Sohag in Upper Egypt.  The Ain El-Serra 
pilot is being conducted as a small scale study. 
Program Indicators 
In 2007, the SRC conducted a survey of the informal housing community in Ain El-Serra, 
to better understand what indicators for poverty would most suit the area.  Based on this study, 
three indicators were selected:  
 Families have at least one child under the age of 15 
 Families experience crowding, defined as more than three people to a 
room 
 Families have high health burden 
 
Institutionalization In late 2008, MOSS formed a committee to head the Ain El-Serra 
program, and to liaise with the team at the Social Research Center.  Additionally, in October 
2008, the MOSS nominated social workers from Assiut, Sohag, and Ain El-Serra to participate 
in the CCT program.  The SRC trained the social workers on social policy, the CCT Program, 
computer literacy, questionnaire development and application as well as on how to communicate 
                                                             
 
2
 This section based on Operational manual of piloting project in Ain El Serra-Egypt 
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with clients.  Of the social workers participating, the SRC chose seven to participate in the Ain 
El-Serra pilot. 
Simultaneously, in late 2008, focus group discussions were carried out with women and 
men from the area, to learn more about the specific needs with regards to women‘s work, costs 
of child education, and health-seeking behavior. Based on this study, and reviews of other 
programs, the following conditionalities were determined to be effective, amenable to 
monitoring, and not burdensome to comply with:   
Box 2: Conditionality of piloting program in Egypt   
Component Conditionalities 
Education 
Raise the educational level 
reached by children 
Children < 15 years: later on becomes less than eighteen 
  Enrolled in school 
  Attend min 85% of school days/ month 
Health 
Improve health status and 
utilization of health services  
  Regular preventive care for children and adults 
  Children to complete immunization schedule by age 24 
months 
  Pregnant women to attend Antenatal Care and Postnatal 
Care (ANC, PNC) and give birth in health facility 
  Male and female adults to attend health education 
sessions 
 
Egypt Human Development Report, 2005 stated the interest of the Egyptian Government 
on setting an intervention for alleviating poverty in the country (Sholakamy, Piloting a 
Conditional Cash Transfer in Egypt, 2010).  In order to achieve this goal the Egyptian Ministry 
of Social Solidarity (MOSS) launched a geographical targeting program to reach the poorest 
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residents of the poorest 1000 villages.  The MOSS then planned and partnered with the Social 
Research Center of the American University in Cairo (SRC) to pilot a new social policy 
program, a Conditional Cash Transfer, in 65 of these villages located in the rural Egyptian 
context of the governorates of Sohag and Assiut
3
.  
The Upper Egypt piloting project, now in the preparatory phase, will provide CCT to 
more poor families in Sohag and Assiut, both governorates that suffer from high concentrations 
of poverty (according to the poverty maps presenting the most poor villages and locations in 
Egypt). 
 
Challenges facing implementation of CCT programs in general: 
 
In the context of the increasing prominence of conditional cash transfer and its existence 
in the agenda of many of the developing countries, there is an urgent need to analyze the 
challenges related to the implementation of CCT programs. Also, there should be 
recommendations and solutions to overcome the challenges, some of which are as follows: 
I. Political challenges 
II. Economic challenges 
III. Administrative challenges 
 
                                                             
 
3
 32 in Assiut and 33 in Sohag 
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I. Political Challenges: 
 Policy makers usually support the implementation of social protection programs, to win 
votes, especially those for the poor and middle income families, but they are always focusing on 
the short term where the election and re-election periods are in place.  The willingness is 
coming where policy makers promise that if elected they will focus on improving economic 
conditions and address the problems of the poor as one of their main agenda. 
  
 Another aspect is that transfer programs without long-term political support provide little 
more than stopgap assistance. When programs frequently stop and start, this weakens the public's 
confidence in the security of future benefits and undermines incentives to pay contributions (for 
insurance based programs) or to vote for existing budget-financed programs (Grosh, 1995). 
 
Another aspect of the political challenges is where few of policy makers intervene in the 
selection of the beneficiaries and decided to whom cash should be transferred or not. This 
interference in the determination of who is eligible may open other kinds of discriminations 
against ethnicity, minority, refugees, districts, and religions. Any of the previous political 
interference will guarantee a failure of any conditional cash transfer program.   In many cases, 
social assistance programs are launched in the aftermath of a ―crisis.‖ When a crisis strikes, 
politicians inevitably demand an immediate response. This can lead to the introduction of 
programs that are expedient but poorly planned (Subbarao, 1997) 
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II. Economic Challenges: 
In order to break the intergenerational poverty, there should be clear understanding of the 
family‘s needs for utilities, education, and health. Without understanding how much a household 
could afford to get the commodities, to send their children to schools, and to receive healthcare, 
there is no hope to break the poverty cycle. Families need to understand that the purpose is that 
when their children have a better education and health, they will be able to earn better living, and 
will be better off compared to their parents. Studying the family from economic perspectives and 
verify their basic needs will assist in designing conditional cash transfer where all or part of 
those problem getting solved.  
 
 Usually cash transfers indexed to changes in the commodities prices, costs of living, or 
minimum level of wages. In case of inflation, the level of prices increases and following to that 
the index level increases which mean an increase of the cost of cash transfer. On the other hand, 
when the economy suffer from recession, more people tend to apply for cash transfer programs 
which put pressure on the outlay for cash transfer programs (Tanzi, 1997).  
  
One of the most frequent complaints about both social insurance and social assistance in 
developing countries is that the sums provided are too small to eliminate poverty for the 
beneficiary groups (Van Ginneken, 1999.). This can be seen as a need to reconsider the amount 
of cash transferred. The value of the cash should provide reasonable value to people where they 
could be better off and less suffering from poverty and satisfy their basic needs.  
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Another key challenge for CCT is to balance the individual‘s need for assistance and their 
willingness to work while receiving cash payments. This dilemma is constructed from different 
factors such as the institutional characteristics of the labor market, the labor laws in effect, 
whether there are incentives to seek work and whether the incentives are strong enough, the labor 
taxes as well affecting the tendency of labor to work in regulated labor sectors or in the shadow 
economy (illustrated in Figure 3) 
 
Figure 3: Labor Supply of the Poor and Transfers Cash 
     Wages Labor Demand 
 
 Labor supply Ls2 (post transfer) 
 
 Labor supply Ls1 (pre-transfer) 
 
W $ (Fixed)  
 
 Labor 
 L2 L1 
Source:  (The World Bank, 2002) 
―The labor supply curve of the transfer recipients shifts to the left, from Ls1 (pre-transfer) 
to Ls2 (post transfer) because they receive some income without working. The effect on 
employment depends on the nature of both labor demand and supply. If labor demand is 
perfectly inelastic (in other words, is not affected by the wage rate) and the wage rate is fixed, 
then employment falls from L1 to L2 with a maximum loss of output. It can be concluded that if 
the amount of cash transferred is not equal to the wages foregone, some families may still be 
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willing to keep their children in school and to reduce their labor somewhat‖. (The World Bank, 
2002). 
Presumably, all families will prefer the cash-plus-school option if the cash transferred is 
equal to or greater than the wage rate, and thus the labor supply will be more affected than is the 
case for lower payments. While this simplified model ignores important features of the labor 
market, it illustrates the risk that overly generous transfer programs will reduce employment‖.  
 
III. Administration Challenges: 
There are large administrative challenges facing the implementation of conditional cash 
transfer.  As stated previously, the governmental capacity to provide services to the poor. There 
should a previously existing health, and education infrastructure and governmental personnel 
capacity in place.  
 
Targeting the beneficiaries (eligibility) is one of the greatest administrative challenges in 
any conditional cash transfer programs. To do that, means tests and income tests are used to 
establish fair eligibility standards and criteria for cash distribution in developed countries but this 
method is difficult to apply accurately in developing countries and would likely exclude a large 
number of the poor. In addition, the selection criteria should be simple and understood by the 
poor because they may not apply if the procedures and criteria is complex. 
 
Administrating the beneficiary data:   
The need for strong management of information systems is very crucial before 
implementing CCT. Due to the inclusion in CCT of large payments of cash, leading to a need for 
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good cash management, it is very important to have information systems that are able to trace the 
eligible beneficiaries, keep track of their records, monitor the amount of cash transferred to each 
family, reduce the processing time for payments and reduce the opportunity for corruption. This 
situation gives rise to the need to use unique identification number for the beneficiaries such as 
the national ID numbers (―bitaqa‖) amongst different social security programs, in order to avoid 
duplication in the process of providing the services to poor families. Allowing information 
sharing among the different MIS and different units within the government will reduce cost of 
operation and guarantee accurate data for planning and evaluation of social safety programs.   
  
   
` 
           Page 46 
 
CHAPTER THREE: Methodology 
Basic Aim of the Research  
In order to address the research questions, this study is to conduct interviews, 
questionnaires, and focus group discussions which directed respectively to the CCT local 
consultants, global experts, and social workers in Egypt.  
 
This study analyzed the standard contents and mechanisms of controls that were applied 
in the other countries‘ CCT programs and provide what could fit Egypt‘s context and constitute a 
proper control and accountability system.  The following step examines the design of CCT from 
implementation standpoint and the implemented polices and procedure to guarantee that the 
program will target the poor and achieve adequate controls on both the administrative and 
financial perspectives. To do this, this study used the World Bank toolkit on tackling Error, 
Fraud, and Corruption as the basis for his research evaluation process at each of the CCT 
program stages eligibility, compliance to program conditionality, and cash disbursing to poor 
families. 
 
The World Bank toolkit intent is to provide a concise but thorough resource for social 
protection practitioners on how to minimize error, fraud and corruption in their program(s). The 
World Bank in this toolkit provides a generic framework for combating EFC (Van Stolk, 2010), 
developed around four building blocks of prevention; detection; deterrence; and measurement. 
This study chooses measures of prevention, detection, and deterrence for combating EFC and 
excluded other measurement and monitoring since it is out of the scope of this research. The 
World Bank finds that it is useful to look at the EFC control strategies of developed countries. 
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These strategies tend to be the most comprehensive and evidence on their effectiveness exists. 
Developed countries‘ experience shows that reducing EFC is feasible and cost-effective 
 
Other measures are added by this study to the list of measures surveyed and it was 
combined with those of the World Bank to introduce the list of measures that are surveyed in this 
research. The addition of these measures came from accounting and management principles that 
match accountability vs. responsibility. In this principle, this study has seen that, adding 
measures to make beneficiary, officials, and program staff accountable, would improve standards 
to reduce EFC in CCT programs.    
 
  This study is going to find which of the provided measures by the World Bank are 
implemented to mitigate EFC in the examined three stages and to which degree these measures 
could be implemented in Egypt. Further, the study is not only examining this, but also to 
introduce the other measures beside those of the World Bank and shed light on which would be 
most likely to work to avoid EFC in Egypt. The latter step covers different elements in order to 
evaluate the program plans, controls, checks and balances.  
 
In summary, this study hypothesizes that other countries‘ successful application of 
mechanisms to control Error, Fraud, and Corruption could be useful and contribute to the 
implementation of CCT in Egypt. Successful cases of developing countries like Brazil, Mexico, 
Chile, and other countries might be worthy of emulation. In the next chapters the research will 
review and present different alternatives to filling the gaps of what Egypt has and what Egypt 
needs to control and protect the resources that are invested in its new CCT program. 
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The systematic qualitative assessment provides answers for the research questions and 
introduces a general set of recommendations to policy makers‘ and assessment of measures 
needed in the implementation of a CCT program in Egypt.  
  
Design and data 
 
This study is focuses on how to protect the conditional cash transfer in Egypt from Error, 
Fraud, and Corruption. Since the program is in its first phases and not matured enough, the 
examination of controls systems are very crucial and will benefit all the interested parties in the 
CCT program not only in Egypt but also for other countries that wish to implement such social 
welfare programs. Any system has its own components. The main components of the conditional 
cash transfer system could be presented as follows: 
 
Government (G): Government needs to achieve some goals from implementing CCT and in 
order to achieve those goals, it employs its capacity to support the program in forms of planning, 
financing , implementing, monitoring, and using outputs in adjusting the plans . The 
implementation of CCT program in Egypt is presented under Egypt‘s Ministry of Social 
Solidarity (MOSS). MOSS is piloting the CCT in rural areas of Upper Egypt to test whether this 
innovative social protection program is an appropriate, effective and empowering tool within the 
Egyptian context. The outcomes of the two year pilot will inform the Government‘s decision on 
scaling-up to a nationwide level. 
Poor Families (F): The poor families in villages of Sohag and Assiut governorates in Upper 
Egypt represent the customers that the government needs to serve. The main goal is to provide 
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those families with adequate capability and access to education, health services, and nutrition. 
On the other side, poor families need to do certain behavior as partners to ensure the success of 
the program and break the cycle of poverty.  
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT): This represents the program as a standalone unit that has its 
own design, polices, regulations, and operation. The cash transfers will be financed by the MOSS 
and the research expenses by the Social Research Center (SRC) grants. Implementation in the 
field will be executed by MOSS social workers that will receive additional training and 
supervision by SRC. The conditionality is coming from the enforced actions or behavior that 
should be followed by poor families in order to get the cash. Cash is transferred once the 
conditionality is met. 
 
The three elements present the system or environment where the CCT is implemented. 
There is a large flow of resources that are moving from government to CCT program and finally 
ends to poor families. Because CCT includes transfers of large amounts of money and other 
public resources, there is the risk that these resources will not reach the intended beneficiaries. 
The risk may include intervention by some or all of the following risks factors; errors, fraud, and 
corruption. There is no guarantee that the interaction between the elements will produce the 
desired results unless there is a proper control mechanism.  
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Triangle Approach 
 
The system could be presented in the form of triangle. This approach provides a triangle 
with three angles; each angle presents one of the system‘s three main elements; G, F, and CCT. 
The components of any system cannot work by its own without interacting with one another. The 
interaction between the elements may take one of the following forms: 
 
 Interaction between G and F: 
 Interaction between F and CCT: 
 Interaction between CCT and G: 
 
Figure 4: Triangle approach of CCT parties 
 
 
System 
Controls
’  
 
S 
 
Control 
System 
 
S 
F: Poor Families 
G: Government CCT Program 
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A risk comes in absence of adequate controls on these interactions. Different forms of risk comes 
through the interaction process as described below 
Risk at the interaction between G and F: 
Risk of Error: This type of risk is related to eligibility of poor families, where the 
Government falls in an unintentional violation of the program rules, inclusion (to 
ineligible) or exclusion errors (of eligible) beneficiaries, transfer of cash methodology, 
and non effective validation system.   
 
System errors: This includes the failure of payment system, failure of IT systems, 
problematic information management, and inadequate monitoring or reporting procedures  
 
Risk at the interaction between F and CCT: 
Two types of risks related to compliance (met the eligibility) come here; 
Fraud: when families intentionally abuse the program. This could happen when families 
provide a false statement, risk of collusion, conceal or distort their relevant information 
especially the information regarding program eligibility (number of rooms, number of 
children, sources of income.etc) and compliance with the conditions. 
Corruption: when program staff intentionally abuse the system rules for their own or 
others‘ benefits. Corruption here involves manipulation of beneficiary rosters (maybe for 
political reasons), receiving illegal payments or benefits from other parties, transfer of 
funds to nonexistent persons or illegal channels.  
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Risk at the interaction between CCT and G:   
Risks are many some of which are government errors, such as inability to secure; 
management of funds, the disbursement of cash, which will be discussed thoroughly in 
this research, provide transparent criteria for eligibility where it is set clearly who is 
eligible and who is not. Also, errors may come from override internal controls or 
breakdown.   
Program staff corruption, such as when program staff is involved in manipulation of the 
controls set by the government to achieve self interest (receiving illegal payment, or 
diverting payments to ghost beneficiaries). Monitoring, managing the large amounts of 
information, and finally the most important, from standpoint of EFC, ensuring existence 
of mechanisms of financial management and auditing.  
 
Fraud as a result of the complexity of the social protection system: This includes cross-
jurisdictional claims and complexity of rules and regulations  
 
The assessment of system administration and financial controls and its ability to avoid 
errors, fraud, and corruption will reveal how effective the system is. Therefore, in this 
study, the research tools to make an assessment of the effective administration and 
financial controls and their ability to protect the system from EFC, will be used. 
It may be that this research cannot cover and assess the whole scope of the risks around 
the implementation of CCT in Egypt due to the limitation of resources and time but the 
research will focus on the most important ones that must be addressed for the integrity of 
the program. 
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Method of Obtaining Information for the Data Items 
 
The methods of obtaining information for such data items were the distribution of two 
types: (questionnaires and focus group discussion). The first type of questionnaires directed to 
global experts and local social workers in Egypt piloting program. It was modified to ask about 
respondent‘s background and program back ground. This modification to the expert 
questionnaire added more value to the other data collected about mitigation mechanisms of error, 
fraud, and corruption at the program three stages. Additional modification related to removal of 
repetitive meaning, phrasing, and those questions that looks very technical such those about 
auditing and accounting activities. Also, the questionnaire has been tested with one of Egypt‘s 
expertise in terms of language and adequate timing. The expert questionnaire divided into four 
sections: 
Section A: Respondent Background characteristics 
Section B: Program Background characteristics 
Section C: program eligibility Criteria: 12 eligibility criteria have been used to test the 
complexity of eligibility criteria at different countries and its impact on the measures to 
mitigate EFC in CCT. 
Section D: Measures that have been used to discourage error, fraud, and corruption in 
CCT programs at each of the following stages 
 Deterrence:  Seven measures to deter EFC in CCT 
 Eligibility: cover the following measures: 
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1. Five measures to prevent EFC 
2. Four measures to detect EFC  
 Compliance to program conditionality 
1. Five measures to prevent EFC 
2. Eight measures to detect EFC  
 Cash disbursement 
1. Three measures to prevent EFC 
2. Seven measures to detect 
 
Survey-monkey website used to serve this type of questionnaire since it is easy and familiar to 
experts. Also, it is easy to analyze and extract the data from it.  
The second type is interviews and focus group discussion directed to social workers 
whom served in Egypt local piloting project in Ain El-Serra. Since the pilot project in its early 
phases and were covering small number of beneficiary, the interview and focus group discussion 
are seeking social workers point of views on how best to implement conditional cash transfer 
programs in Egypt in the future on a larger scale focusing on mechanisms to mitigate error, 
fraud, and corruption, based on the experience in the pilot project, their professional knowledge, 
and to the best of their ability.  
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Method of Data Collection 
 
Interviews: 
In the preliminary research phase, interviews have been conducted by this study with 
experts from social research center at the American university in Cairo, besides expert from 
UNICEF- monitoring and evaluation unit in Cairo. I interviewed those experts as the topic needs 
expert matter persons in order to transfer the knowledge they get from the field and to get their 
advice based on their experience and knowledge about the Egyptian context. 
 
Questionnaires: 
The standard measures to mitigate EFC, have been taken from the World Bank paper on tackling 
EFC (Van Stolk, 2010) and have been used in the research surveyed questionnaire 
 
The study of the previous country experiments that was previously introduced created a 
relationship between their pioneer experiments as ―best practices‖, which inspired other 
countries like Egypt to follow their experiences, and our expectation behind the implementation 
of same programs.  It was also chosen since it was composed of simple phrases that could easily 
be translated to the Arabic language without causing confusion. 
 
Providing another version of questionnaire to social workers who served at piloting local 
CCT program was very helpful. In addition, a focus group discussion was held with the social 
workers who worked in the Ain El-Serra pilot project to explore their future visions on how to 
improve CCT program in Egypt regarding EFC measures. Two job classes were involved in the 
focus group: program administrative director and five social workers. 
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The method of data collection depended on self-administered surveys; almost 40 
measures are primarily distributed through online survey-monkey. This distribution method was 
chosen to ensure higher response rate and increased cooperation on the part of respondents, as 
well as the ability to choose participants that exactly fit the parameters of interest. However, this 
targeting was in no way biased or planned in advance. 
 
Focus group discussion 
The focus groups were conducted a few hours after the questionnaire to allow the 
participant‘s time to reflect on the topic. They were all conducted by this study to control for any 
differences that might occur. The focus groups were conducted using pre-specified questions that 
were prepared based on the global experts‘ responses to the expert questionnaire version. 
Finally, the proposed recommendations and actions that have to be taken to improve the 
implementation of CCT program and achieve the required goals are presented and discussed 
from point of whether they are consistent with Egyptian law and procedures. 
 
Emailing  
Emailing global experts following to the questionnaire on their views of common risks of 
error, fraud, and corruption in CCT and their vision on how to mitigate such risks are obtained 
thorough e-mailing two questions serving these purpose. This methodology added valuable 
inputs from experts worked as consultants for CCT programs in other countries.  The questions 
were as follows: 
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 Please tell me from your own perspective; what are the most 
famous causes for error, fraud, and corruption in CCT program? 
 What is the most workable measure to mitigate error, fraud, and 
corruption in CCT program? 
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CHAPTER FOUR: Description of Data Collected 
 
The research samples are directed to two main groups: 
 Global experts and program managers from around the world 
countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Chile, other countries. 
 Local experts from researchers, consultants, officials, and social 
workers who worked in piloting of CCT program in Egypt.  
The research sample of global expert persons is limited but representative, it depends on expert 
matter from different programs and organizations. The questionnaire is distributed to more than 
250 expert, consultant, program director, field worker, donors.etc, received 54 respond of which 
are 32 completed. 
 
The research sample of local social workers (group of six persons and a head), presents 
100 Percent of social workers worked in piloting in Ain El-Serra project. The social workers 
were not told that this was a study on fraud and corruption so as not to bias the results. Both 
questionnaires that were used composed of almost 40 questions excluding data on the 
respondent‘s background, program background, and eligibility criteria that was used. Questions 
regarding respondent‘s background and program background were seen as necessary group the 
sample within the same pattern of experience and background and find what the distribution of 
these groupings is.  
A pretesting of the questionnaire was done on local expert in CCT and local social 
worker whom fit the parameters of interest, but no significant changes were made. The survey 
was done by using survey-monkey for global experts and visiting the local social workers at their 
local social unit in Ain El-Serra and it took around one month to collect the data required.  
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Each data item was assigned a specific number of questions included in the scoring sheet 
(Appendix  1and Appendix 2) and respondents were asked to rate the measures of mitigating 
error, fraud, and corruption on an ordinal scale by giving their choice to one of the following 
answers: 
 The measure is not used (Score of one has been assigned to this answer) 
 The measure is used and was highly effective (Score of five has been assigned to this 
answer) 
 The measure is used and somewhat effective (Score of four has been assigned to this 
answer) 
 The measure is used with  low level of effectiveness (Score of three has been assigned to 
this answer) 
 The measure is used and not effective at all (Score of two has been assigned to this 
answer) 
 Don‘t know/ Not sure (Score of Zero has been assigned to this answer) 
 
 Following the directions of the original questionnaire scoring key, answers were given 
scores of 0 to 5 that were later re-coded by multiplying the standard score of each choice by 
the total number of participants who chose this answer. To group respondents into high and 
low categories, those in the high category were respondents who answered ―used and high 
effective‖ or ―used and somewhat effective‖ ‖, while those in the low category answered 
―used with low level of effectiveness‖ or  ―used and was not effective at all.‖ Answers of 
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―Not sure/ don‘t Know‖ were excluded in subsequent analysis. This grouping was done due 
to the ordinal nature of the data. 
 
To identify the significant correlation, this study looked to the table of correlation 
coefficient at degree of freedom: df = n-2 (where n the number of surveyed experts), and level of 
significance= 0.05. The result is a value of correlation coefficient equal to .349. That means, if 
the absolute value of the correlation coefficient were less than .349, there is not a statistically 
significant correlation between provided measures and if it exceeds .349, it is assumed to have 
significance correlation between the two tested measures. This principle will be applied through 
the whole statistical analysis in this research. 
 
To answer the research question/s, the research worked on the successful implemented 
financial and administrative elements in global countries that implemented CCT program. To 
answer the sub-questions, the research is worked on two separate sections for assessments. The 
first section is for the administrative elements, and it discusses avoiding EFC risks at stages of 
Eligibility and Compliance. The second section is for the financial elements, and it discusses 
avoiding EFC risks at Cash Disbursement. Each of which covered in the assessment process and 
how it impacts the program.  
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Respondents Background Characteristics: (covered by questions from Q # 1 to Q # 5) 
 
The sample obtained was composed of 40% female respondents and 60% male 
respondents, most of whom (41% of participants) were between the ages of 35 and 55. Survey 
respondents broken down according to their experience with CCT programs activities are as 
follows: 
Figure 5: Respondents distribution by activities 
 
Translating these activities into job title of the participants and their role in the CCT 
program shows that the surveying was directed to a variety of experts from different 
backgrounds which enriched the inputs and added value to the analysis. Some of the participants 
job titles are; Monitoring and Evaluation Manager, Policy Specialist, Associate Professor, 
Director of Operations, Health Sector Consultant, officer in the national Social Cabinet, 
international consultant, Researchers, General Director Programming and Budget, Ministry of 
Finance. Full list of survey participants job titles, and role in the program presented in Appendix 
3, and Appendix 4 respectively.  
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Program Background Characteristics: (covered by questions from Q # 6 to Q # 9) 
Country of implementation 
The respondents represented a variety of geographical areas where CCT programs have 
been implemented. This variety provided the different contexts of implemented controls in CCT 
programs. These geographical areas grouped and used in the data analysis to see whether cross 
sectional analysis of the applied mechanisms of control could provide information on patterns of 
applications and level of maturity on EFC controls. 
From the below graph, although the survey has been distributed to various experts around 
the world, we can conclude that the majority of respondents are form Mexico, Brazil and Turkey. 
This may refer to level of transparency and maturity in these programs and real willingness from 
these program experts to share their experience and results with the rest of the world.  
 
Figure 6: Respondents categories by country of implementation  
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Area in which the CCT program is implemented   
 72 Percent provided that the program is implemented in both rural and urban areas, 20 Percent 
in rural areas only and only 8Percent provides that CCT is implemented in urban areas only. 
 
Figure 7: Respondents categories by area of implementation  
  
 
Total number of beneficiaries covered by the program 
The number of beneficiary was very important characteristic because it tells us how the 
applied controls worked in countries with large number of beneficiaries. 56Percent of the survey 
participants provided their responses on EFC controls in countries with more than three million 
beneficiaries including some (5 countries) up to 50 million beneficiary, 35Percent with less than 
half million, 3Percent falls between .5 and 1 million, and 6Percent reported that 2 million 
beneficiary  
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Figure 8: Number of beneficiaries household covered by the program   
  
 
―Summary about Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in some countries are provided in 
Appendix 5‖ 
Research Limits: 
Subject limits:  
1. The limited published papers about the implemented pilot program in Egypt, most of 
the published sources are in forms of presentation, slides, newspapers articles, and little 
from official sources. 
2. The challenge and risk beneath a comparison of two different programs being 
implemented in different environments, program level of maturity, geography, timing, 
political, and economic conditions. 
3. The information from developing countries is scarcer, as only few programs and 
countries have taken measures to combat and/or measure the incidence of EFC 
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4. The implementation of the CCT in Egypt still in its early phases  
5. As well the subject of this research is new to Egypt and still not matured; thus this 
study faced some sensitivity in discussing EFC. This sensitivity caused some 
difficulties in gathering full details and information about the mechanisms, financial 
and control polices (Lawaaeeh‘) that are already prepared but not yet published.   
6. Limited access to data through governmental and official employee from MOSS and 
MOF. 
7. The analysis of data collected is limited to data gathered from global program expertise 
and social workers working in Egyptian piloting program in Ain El-Serra.  
8. Local social workers pointed their views on mechanisms to mitigate error, fraud, and 
corruption, based on their experience in the pilot project, their professional knowledge, 
and to the best of their ability. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: Analysis of Data 
 
In this chapter, the results obtained from the questionnaires, interviews, e-mails, and the 
focus groups are reported. They are organized in a question-answer format, where the results 
obtained from each question are reported with the aid of some illustrative charts. The results are 
divided into three sections:  
1. Questionnaire, which includes the results obtained from two sources ; the experts and 
social workers 
2. Focus Groups, which includes the results obtained from the focus group discussion with 
local social workers 
3. Emails received form CCT experts viewing their visions on risks of EFC and visions on 
how to mitigate these risks. 
 
  The data derived from questionnaires analyzed through use of MS-Excel (Add-in) data 
analysis functions. Variables were described in terms of frequency and percentage. The tests 
conducted included correlation analysis to examine the relationship between provided measures 
to control EFC in CCT programs. In addition, the descriptive statistics such as mean values is 
used.  
Examining of eligibility criteria that was used into CCT programs (global Vs local context) 
Covered by questions from Q# 10 to Q# 21 
This study main goal in comparing the eligibility criteria that was used in global CCT 
programs, and compare it with same criteria that was used in Egypt is to determine whether 
Egypt can benefit from other countries experience on setting eligibility criteria to avoid targeting 
error.   
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According to the World Bank ―The extent of targeting errors indicates whether the 
program achieves its (poverty alleviation) objective or not. These errors may be due to program 
design (when, for administrative feasibility, the program uses imperfect poverty proxies to 
identify poor beneficiaries) and to program implementation (when eligibility decisions diverge 
from the program rules). The later errors are, in turn, due to error, fraud or corruption‖ (Toolkit 
on Tackling Error, Fraud and Corruption in Social Protection Programs, 2010) 
 
The input from both global experts and Egypt local social workers on the questions on 
whether any of the following eligibility criteria have been used or not, can be explored in the 
following schedule: 
Schedule A: Comparison of used eligibility criteria between global experts vs. Egypt Piloting 
CCT 
Eligibility criteria  Global experts Egypt – Piloting CCT project 
of Ain El-Serra 
Eligibility criteria 
description 
Used  Not Used Used  Not Used 
dwelling unit size  / number 
of rooms 
28 % 72% 100%  
 Number of people per room 
(crowding) 
29.0% 71.0% 100%  
Marital status of the 
household 
25.0% 75.0% 20% 80% 
Whether a family has 90.0% 10.0% 100%  
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children less than 18 years of 
age   
Whether any of the 
household head has a health 
burden 
25.0% 75.0% 
 
100%  
Whether household head is 
working 
39% 61%  100% 
Whether there is a social 
security payment received 
by household 
37.0% 63.0% 100%  
Was there an accessibility of 
the household to social 
protection schemes 
41% 59%  100% 
Whether the family has child 
labor 
15% 85%  100% 
 
The above schedule show the eligibility criteria that was used in different CCT programs 
around the world and those criteria that was used in Egypt piloting CCT program. The use of the 
housing indicators (dwelling / number of rooms, the crowding per room), was considered one of 
the eligibility criteria in Ain El-Serra piloting project. Also, the criterion of whether the 
household suffers from a health burden was used, and both criteria‘s are somewhat different 
from global practice.  This may explained in that the Egyptian programs is at early 
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implementation phase (still a pilot) and may be different when scaled up. In addition, this 
approach may suit the Egyptian context in geographical areas such as Ain El-Serra.  
 
Some of the global experts provided that they have used other eligibility criteria that are 
formed by 17 variables to categorize households socioeconomically, and then targeting specific 
households. Others provided methods like number of school-age children, whether the household 
has a dirt floor, and whether the family has a car and other appliances (refrigerator). Another 
programs uses proxy means test that includes many variables of demographic characteristics of 
the family, education, labor participation and income of family  
In general, to avoid targeting error where poor families may be excluded from the 
program, the eligibility criteria should be simple and understood by families. The simplicity of 
eligibility criteria will reduce the targeting errors and support the program efforts to avoid fraud 
action by non eligible families who try to gain access to the program benefits. 
  Examining of deterrence measures applied into CCT programs Covered by questions # 22 
 
Under this section, program use of seven possible measures to deter and discourage EFC 
in CCT program was explored.  Possible answers included that the measure was not used, was 
used with different degrees of effectiveness (Highly effective, somewhat effective, low level of 
effectiveness, not effective at all), or was unknown to the respondent.  
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Figure 9: Deterrence measures used in CCT programs  
 
The descriptive analysis of data set shows the following (Appendix # 6)    
  The measure ―Establish public awareness campaigns to 
ensure beneficiaries and community members understand 
how the program will deter fraud and corruption” has got 
support by most of CCT program experts since it was used with 
high effectiveness and got a high score of 58Percent. 
 However, the measure of ―Training staff to ensure they have 
a clear understanding of what constitutes error, fraud, and 
corruption” came in the second level of preferences and it was 
scored 55Percent as it was used with high effectiveness.  
 On the third level of scoring the measure of ―Use 
administrative penalties or formal cautions directed to 
clients who provide incorrect compliance information” with 
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only 31Percent of the respondents confirmed that it was used 
and somewhat effective to mitigate EFC.    
 A  low scoring are recorded for the following measures :  
 Putting in place strong criminal penalties for 
fraudulent actions by program staff or beneficiaries ; 
52 Percent not using this measure compared to only 
3Percent use this with high effective and 15Percent 
using it with somewhat effective 
 Strengthening laws and regulations that govern 
punishment for fraud or corruption by beneficiaries; 
33 Percent not using this measure compared to only 
15Percent use this with high effective and 6Percent 
using it with somewhat effective  
 Strengthening laws and regulations that govern 
punishment for fraud or corruption by program 
officials; 33 Percent not using this measure compared to 
only 6Percent use this with high effective and 21Percent 
using it with somewhat effective  
 Use administrative penalties or formal cautions 
directed to school officials who provide incorrect 
compliance; 27 Percent not using this measure 
compared to only 21Percent use this with high effective 
and 30Percent using it with somewhat effective  
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The previous measures are scored as not used measures in most countries except in the 
older programs such as Brazil and Mexico where these programs tend to use these measures at a 
higher rate. , Other reasons of not using such measures might include social or political 
unacceptability of punishing these people, or fear of losing the cooperation of school officials or 
others needed for the program to succeed. 
 Furthermore, and according to the World Bank toolkit to control EFC report; ―the 
deterrence controls in general ―underutilized‖ in developing countries CCT programs. The 
reasons of underutilization vary, some because of lack of laws and regulations of overpayment 
cases, and the absence of clear definition of fraud in social security systems‖. Further 
investigation may be requested to stand for reasons of not using such measures‖. 
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Table 1: Descriptive analysis of deterrence measures  
 
 Training staff to 
ensure they have a 
clear understanding 
of what constitutes 
error, fraud, and 
corruption  
Putting in place 
strong criminal 
penalties for 
fraudulent actions 
by program staff 
or beneficiaries  
Strengthening 
laws and 
regulations that 
govern 
punishment for 
fraud or 
corruption by 
beneficiaries  
Strengthening laws 
and regulations 
that govern 
punishment for 
fraud or corruption 
by program 
officials  
Establish public 
awareness to 
ensure 
beneficiaries 
understand how 
the program will 
deter fraud and 
corruption  
Use 
administrative 
penalties 
directed to 
clients who 
provide 
incorrect 
compliance 
information.  
Use administrative 
penalties or formal 
cautions directed to 
school officials 
who provide 
incorrect 
compliance  
Mean 3.52 1.27 1.42 1.48 3.58 2.61 1.52 
Median 5.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.00 4.00 1.00 
Mode 5.00 1.00 - - 5.00 4.00 1.00 
Sum 116.00 42.00 47.00 49.00 118.00 86.00 50.00 
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Table 2: Correlation analysis between deterrence measures 
Deterrence 
measures 
Training staff 
to ensure 
they have a 
clear 
understandin
g of what 
constitutes 
error, fraud, 
and 
corruption  
Putting in 
place strong 
criminal 
penalties 
for 
fraudulent 
actions by 
program 
staff or 
beneficiarie
s  
Strengthenin
g laws and 
regulations 
that govern 
punishment 
for fraud or 
corruption by 
beneficiaries  
Strengthenin
g laws and 
regulations 
that govern 
punishment 
for fraud or 
corruption by 
program 
officials  
Establish 
public 
awareness 
campaigns 
to ensure 
beneficiarie
s and 
community 
members 
understand 
how the 
program 
will deter 
fraud and 
corruption  
Use 
administrativ
e penalties or 
formal 
cautions 
directed to 
clients who 
provide 
incorrect 
compliance 
information.  
Use 
administrativ
e penalties or 
formal 
cautions 
directed to 
school 
officials who 
provide 
incorrect 
compliance  
Training staff to 
ensure clear 
understanding of 
what constitutes EFC  
          1.00              
Putting criminal 
penalties for 
fraudulent actions by 
program staff  
          0.33            1.00            
Strengthening laws 
and regulations for 
FC by beneficiaries  
          0.26            0.36            1.00          
Strengthening laws 
and regulations for 
FC by program 
officials  
          0.40            0.66            0.68            1.00        
Establish public 
awareness campaigns 
to ensure full-
understanding on 
how to deter FC  
          0.73            0.12            0.33            0.20            1.00      
Use administrative 
penalties or formal 
cautions on who 
provide incorrect 
compliance info.  
          0.24            0.31            0.26            0.34            0.37            1.00    
Use administrative 
penalties to school 
officials who provide 
incorrect compliance  
          0.36            0.28            0.41            0.49            0.35            0.25            1.00  
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Correlation and descriptive statistical analysis are conducted on the seven measures showed a 
positive relationship as follows: 
 A significant correlation exist between ―Training staff to 
ensure they have a clear understanding of what constitutes 
error, fraud, and corruption” which tend to be paired with 
higher scores on the other measure to establish “public 
awareness campaigns to ensure beneficiaries and 
community members understand how the program will 
deter fraud and corruption”. This indicate that CCT programs 
tend to train its staff on understanding what are EFC and as well 
works on the second dimension which is public awareness.  
From the data set, this might be considered one of the strategies 
that commonly used in CCT. Many programs in Mexico, Brazil, 
Philippines, El Salvador, and Egypt combined both measures as 
effective measures to mitigate EFC in CCT programs.   
 The mean value of the above correlated measures shows that the 
two measures are the most commonly used that describe 
program tendency in using deterrence mechanisms in CCT 
programs.  
 Also, an indication of significance correlation between the 
measure of ―Putting in place strong criminal penalties for 
fraudulent actions by program staff or beneficiaries”  and its 
relation to the other two measures;  ―Strengthening laws and 
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regulations that govern punishment for fraud or corruption 
by program officials” and ―Strengthening laws and 
regulations that govern punishment for fraud or corruption 
by beneficiaries” 
Although these measures were not supported by most of the surveyed countries but they have 
significance correlation since they are all dealing with regulation and putting in place 
accountability action toward EFC actions. 
  
This could be explained in the context of countries that are old in implementing CCT like 
Mexico and Brazil since those are the countries implementing these measures. For other 
countries that are not using these measures , this could refer to lack of laws and regulations that 
govern EFC in social protection programs, or it could be that they prefer not to use these 
measures for policy reasons.  
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Examining of measures that have been used to prevent EFC at eligibility stage Covered by 
questions # 23 
Under this section five measures to prevent EFC in CCT program at eligibility stage. The 
following measures are used with high effectiveness to prevent CCT programs from EFC: 
 
Figure 10: Preventive measures used at eligibility stage 
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Table 3: Correlation analysis between prevention measures at eligibility stage 
Prevention measures Design 
a stage 
of data 
collecti
on 
proces
s to 
identif
y cases  
Begin 
with a 
mappin
g of the 
commu
nity  
Involvem
ent of 
civil 
society 
organizati
ons  in 
the 
program 
design  
Use of  
IT 
systems 
in the 
verificat
ion of 
proves 
of 
eligibilit
y 
against 
national 
database
s  
Training 
for 
program 
staff on 
mechani
sms to 
prevent  
error, 
fraud, 
and 
corruptio
n  
Design a stage of data collection process to identify cases  1     
Begin with a mapping of the community  0.74 1    
Involvement of civil society organizations  in the program design  0.41 0.29 1   
Use of  IT systems in the verification of proves of eligibility 
against national databases  
0.37 0.17 0.21 1  
Training for program staff on mechanisms to prevent  error, 
fraud, and corruption  
0.68 0.47 0.53 0.24 1 
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 “Design a stage of data collection process to identify cases”: 
A high scored measure which heavily emphasis the importance 
of the design phases when it comes to prevention. Also, a strong 
significant correlation to ―mapping of the community” has 
been proven the importance of the mapping to prevent from 
errors of inclusion and exclusion of poor families into the 
program.  
 “Begin with a mapping of the community”: This measure 
used as highly effective measure and favored by most of the 
participants which introduce an important role to the mapping of 
community and identifying who should included and provide 
maps for areas and families who deserve the program coverage.  
 “Use of IT systems in the verification of proves of eligibility 
against national databases”: more than half of the respondents 
confirmed the importance of using IT solutions in the 
verification process , this is because experiments of those 
countries shows how the use of IT solution in the verification is 
highly effective and cost effective when used . Also, correlate to 
design stage; this would facilitate use of IT since the early 
phases. 
 “Training for program staff on mechanisms to prevent 
error, fraud, and corruption”:  This measure got high support 
by respondents since training program staff is important to 
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rationalize the investment in CCT. Program staff who got 
training on what is considered error, fraud, and corruption has 
more ability to succeed in their mission. Also, it has a strong 
correlation to the measure of “design of data collection 
process”. This correlation may refer to tendency of the program 
administration to train program staff first on how to prevent 
EFC actions, then how to identify them when happening. This 
preventive mechanism of learning would support and set sense 
of prevention inside program staff rather depending only on 
setting only mechanisms of identifying EFC.  
Table 4: Descriptive analysis of prevention measures at eligibility stage 
 Design a stage of 
data collection 
process to 
identify cases  
Begin with a 
mapping of the 
community  
Involvement of civil 
society organizations  
in the program 
design  
Use of  IT systems in 
the verification of 
proves of eligibility 
against national 
databases  
Training for program 
staff on mechanisms to 
prevent  error, fraud, 
and corruption  
Mean           3.88            3.94            2.73            3.39            3.27  
Median           5.00            5.00            3.00            5.00            4.00  
Mode           5.00            5.00            1.00            5.00            5.00  
Sum       128.00        130.00          90.00        112.00        108.00  
 
The mean value of the above first four measures shows that those measures are the most 
commonly used ones among the programs surveyed for prevention mechanisms from EFC at 
eligibility stage.  
The fifth measure was used more rarely.   
 “Involvement of civil society organizations in the program 
design”:  have taken the least score by 24Percent said that it is 
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used and highly effective, 24Percent used and somewhat 
effective, and 27Percent confirmed it is not used. 
The analysis of the prevention measures that was used in the eligibility stage showed that 
most of these measures were used by CCT programs in Mexico, Brazil, El Salvador, and Egypt 
to build a block to combat EFC at early stage of the program. This is less costly than trying to 
defeat EFC in later stages and an effective method to ensure the proper procedure and capacity 
are in place. The absence of such measures in early implementation phases would leave risks of 
EFC unmanageable and put the program at high risk. 
  
The comments that were made on preventive measures at eligibility stage by the 
participants in the focus group discussion that was held with the local social workers could be 
analyzed as follows:  
 Measures need to be considered at eligibility stage and would help to reduce EFC: 
Increase the role of social workers in determination of families‘ eligibility  
―Although this is a very important measure, there is no consideration to social 
workers inputs in the eligibility stage. His role is important since he is the most 
capable person to describe families‘ social status‖  
Social workers have seen that their inputs at eligibility stage should be added and have 
reasonable weight in process of determining families‘ eligibility. This may add value since social 
workers inputs is coming from real valuation to poor families status and judgment of whether 
they really need to be covered by CCT program or not. This may raise the argument of cost 
benefit analysis which will be discussed later in the research implication.   
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 Total number of people per room (crowding) criteria as one of 
the major eligibility criteria needs reconsideration 
―The crowding measure is not that important to be put in the first priority to choose the 
eligible families. I will tell a lot about families who are not suffering from crowding but 
so needy because they have ill family members or family members suffering from 
chronic diseases‖ 
Social workers have seen that the crowding criteria should not take heavy weight in the 
assessment process of families‘ eligibility. Social workers provided stories on one family who 
tried to defraud their investigation of family social status during the visits by social workers to 
determine whether families are eligible or not. The family invited their relatives to show that 
they have crowding and have many children. On the second following visit, the real count of 
family members was discovered and the family excluded from the list of potential families for 
eligibility to CCT program. 
The view of the social workers is that crowding is a valid measure but should have lower 
weight compared to other standards. In addition, some poor families have no crowding and still 
in position of being eligible due to their very low social status.  The data collected from global 
experts‘ surveys supports this view as the crowding criterion is only used in 28Percent vs. 72 
Percent that are not using it along all the countries that have been surveyed. 
On comparing the data obtained from global expert‘s visions about involving civil society 
organization into the design stage, the data indicate that the Egyptian model does not involve 
NGOs into the design stage.  One possible reason is that in Egypt some NGOs may be subject to 
a lot of conflict of interest or political pressure.  It is believed by some of the participants that 
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some NGOs can be used to pressure the poor to vote in support of certain political parties during 
the  election.  
One of social workers provided that:  
―Before involving civil society organization into the social protection programs, there 
must be awareness session to Egyptian people on how to use their rights and how to deal 
with the civil society organizations. Some civil society organizations try to pressure on 
the poor for getting their votes before election by promising that they will provide them 
with financial aid and Ramadan package (in-kind holy month package of sugar, food oil, 
and other food items)‖   
There is a higher possibility after the Egyptian revolution of January 25
th
 of preventing political 
intervention in the program design or in the determination of targeting. It is hoped that the 
revolution will preserve the rights of all Egyptians to feel freedom when choosing their 
representative and will provide mechanisms to prevent such political intervention.     
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  Examining of measures that have been used to detect EFC at eligibility stage Covered by 
questions # 24 
This section focuses on mechanisms of checks and balance, review of eligibility, and methods of 
verification of information provided by participated families in the program.  
Figure 11: Detection measures used at eligibility stage  
 
Table 5: Descriptive analysis of detection measures at eligibility stage 
 Systems to facilitate data 
matching of the participant 
families across different data 
sources.  
To focus eligibility 
checks on high-
risk groups  
Recertify eligibility 
periodically to detect 
fraudulent actions  
Make thorough cross-checks 
of registries to detect 
inconsistencies. 
Mean 2.82 2.36 2.94 3.00 
Median 4.00 1.00 4.00 4.00 
Mode 5.00 1.00 5.00 5.00 
Sum 93.00 78.00 97.00 99.00 
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Table 6: Correlation analysis between detection measures at eligibility stage 
Detection measures   Systems to facilitate data 
matching of the 
participant families 
across different data 
sources.  
To focus eligibility 
checks on high-risk 
groups  
Recertify 
eligibility 
periodically to 
detect fraudulent 
actions  
Make thorough 
cross-checks of 
registries to 
detect 
inconsistencies. 
Systems to facilitate data 
matching of the participant 
families across different data 
sources.  
1    
To focus eligibility checks on 
high-risk groups  
0.52 1   
Recertify eligibility periodically 
to detect fraudulent actions  
0.38 0.51 1  
Make thorough cross-checks of 
registries to detect 
inconsistencies. 
0.53 0.55 0.49 1 
 
Four measures are presented under this section and shows positive correlation as follows: 
 Although one third (33Percent) of respondents reported that the 
measure of “To focus eligibility checks on high-risk groups” 
was not used, it shows positive correlation with two other 
measures: ―Recertify eligibility periodically to detect 
fraudulent actions” and ―Make thorough cross-checks of 
registries to detect inconsistencies”. This could be understood 
in the context that the latter two measures would work to update 
program with families‘ status, and detect any inconsistency in 
families‘ records. Combining the use of the recertification of 
families‘ eligibility besides the cross-checks of families registry 
might be more likely to be in use by CCT program 
administration because it is less costly than using eligibility 
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checks on high-risk groups‘ mechanisms. “Make thorough 
cross-checks of registries to detect inconsistencies”: This 
measure has got the highest score by 46Percent as ―was used 
and highly effective‖ measure and at same time has got the 
highest mean which present a commonly applied measure to 
detect EFC in eligibility stage. 
Data collected from Focus Group discussion that was held with social workers in Egypt 
confirmed that the pilot program in Egypt did not relay too much on using IT solutions to 
detect any inconsistency in poor families‘ data. Also, this study recommended establishing 
direct link between local social unit and government official database. Such link would 
facilitate the work of social workers when verifying family‘s eligibility and detecting and 
reporting any cases of incompliance to program conditionality. 
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Examining of measures that have been used to prevent EFC at compliance to program 
conditionality stage Covered by questions # 25 
Figure 12: Preventive measures used at compliance stage 
 
On this stage only two measures out of five were supported to prevent EFC at the compliance 
stage. The first measure is ―Determine the nature of the problems facing families and 
support the family” which scored by 47Percent as used and highly effective measure, whereas 
the second measure ―Allocation of Government inter-departmental responsibilities” has got 
average scoring as one of the prevention measures at compliance. Other measures were having 
lower support by program mangers and consultants as an indication to that the program design is 
not focusing on the prevention measures that set the involved parties accountable for their fraud 
and corruption actions.  Again, setting different parties accountable and punish them still not 
supported by surveyed programs. Punishing lack support because it may be seen as a tool that 
causes mistrust and fears from participated parties.
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Table 7: Descriptive analysis of prevention measures at compliance stage 
Prevention measures at 
compliance   
Allocation of 
Government inter-
departmental 
responsibilities  
Determine the nature of 
the problems facing 
families and support 
the family 
Warning or punishing  
of families that bribe 
program officials to 
falsely confirm 
compliance with 
program conditionality  
Warning and punishing 
school officials who 
provide wrong 
compliance 
verification.  
Warning and punishing 
health workers who 
provide wrong 
compliance verification  
Allocation of 
Government inter-
departmental 
responsibilities  
1     
Determine the nature of 
the problems facing 
families and support the 
family 
0.56 1.00    
Warning or punishing  of 
families that bribe 
program officials to 
falsely confirm 
compliance with program 
conditionality  
0.63 0.39 1.00   
Warning and punishing 
school officials who 
provide wrong 
compliance verification.  
0.63 0.40 0.89 1.00  
Warning and punishing 
health workers who 
provide wrong 
compliance verification  
0.62 0.42 0.89 0.99 1.00 
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The following measures achieved positive correlation since ―the determination of problems 
faced by families” measure needs cooperation between ―inter-governmental units and 
departments” in order to prevent falling into these problems and to solve then when they 
happen.  
 
Although   the other three measures ―Warning or punishing of families that bribe 
program officials to falsely confirm compliance with program conditionality”, “Warning 
and punishing school officials who provide wrong compliance verification” , and “Warning 
and punishing health workers who provide wrong compliance verification” in average 
scored as ―Not used ―and ―low effective‖ , there is high significant correlation amongst those 
measure and the allocation of inter- governmental and departmental responsibilities since 
warning program officials , schools , and health officials needs clear allocation of inter-
governmental responsibilities  as pre-requisite to warning actions. In addition, if there is a willing 
to be tougher enforcement, it will require more coordination between government and, as the 
program may lack the appropriate authority.  
 
Not only within the intergovernmental coordination is required but existence of political 
support, up to the president, is a key factor to the success of the program because the 
interministerial coordination, in large, are acting and interpreting the president‘s needs. Also, 
establishment of an entity with sufficient power to coordinate the various participants in the 
program, and the mechanism for controlling the program compliance verification is very crucial 
to the success of the program. There may be set of incentives to coordinate and encourage the 
cooperation between government officials, program officers, and  
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Focus group discussion that was held with the local social workers in Egypt provided the 
following on the prevention mechanisms of EFC in the compliance stage: 
 Social workers have seen that lack of cooperation and 
coordination between inter-governmental units would led to 
inefficiency in achieving the program goals 
 ―We have faced difficulty with governmental units to cooperate 
and provide the public services….when scaling the  program 
more cooperation and coordination is required as for the good of 
the program future‖  
 There is a trend in the piloting project on avoiding threatening 
families by punishments if they abide by the program rules. 
Some of the participating families don‘t believe that there will 
be punishments, and they have seen that applying terms of 
social contract is limited to cutting the cash and terminate them 
from the program.  
 The piloting program social workers provided that by 
investigating of families failing to comply with program 
conditionality, they may be more bale to understand and analyze 
the reasons behind these withdrawals‘. Analyzing the reason 
would help the social workers and program administrators to 
understand whether the reasons related to program design or 
conditionality and if related the program administrators could 
work on improving the conditions that causes the problems.   
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Examining of measures that have been used to detect EFC at compliance to program 
conditionality stage Covered by questions # 26 
Figure 13: Detection measures used at compliance stage 
 
 
Eight measures have been proven positive and significant correlated and achieved high scores as 
in application measures with high effectiveness (ranged from 34.4Percent to 53.1. Percent ) . 
Same measures have got high scores as they have been used and were somewhat effective 
(ranged from 6Percent up to 19Percent). So, the detection measures are classified as high 
category measures. 
These results show that the detection measures at compliance stage have given more attention by 
the CCT program administration at most of the globe than to prevention measures.   
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Table 8: Correlation analysis between detection measures at compliance stage 
Detection measures of compliance 
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children  school attendance 
1        
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monitor children   & family health 
checkup records  
0.62 1       
Streamline of eligibility determination and 
related program rules to reduce level of 
ambiguity  
0.36 0.45 1      
Establish hotlines to receive complaints of 
families on non-compliance issues  
0.30 0.46 0.58 1     
If families refuse to comply with 
conditions, a family will be excluded from 
the program  
0.48 0.57 0.74 0.42 1    
Make regular visits by social workers to 
facilitate and encourage family compliance 
0.54 0.48 0.46 0.38 0.62 1   
Sample selections of cases for independent 
monitoring of  outcomes to detect 
problems 
0.52 0.48 0.55 0.44 0.59 0.48 1  
Cross-check of compliance from supplier 
of service  
0.40 0.39 0.52 0.52 0.35 0.41 0.37 1 
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As per data obtained on the eight measures, there are more correlated measures some of which 
are as follows: 
 “Regular visits by social workers to schools” correlated to 
―regular visits to healthcare centers” since both are 
complementing one another and reporting the progress that 
children of poor families have for schooling and getting 
healthcare services. 
 “Streamline eligibility rules to reduce ambiguity” strongly 
correlated to ―families exclusion from the program whenever 
non-compliance reported”. In this context, if the program 
rules are clear and simple, it is easier to exclude families that do 
not comply. 
 “If families refuse to comply with conditions, a family will 
be excluded from the program” correlated to “Make regular 
visits by social workers to facilitate and encourage family 
compliance”. This indicates that social worker visits are being 
used to give the families a chance to comply, but then those who 
still do not comply are excluded.  
 
  
` 
           Page 94 
 
Table 9: Descriptive analysis of detection measures at compliance stage 
Detection 
measures 
of 
compliance 
Regular 
visits to 
schools  to 
monitor 
children  
school 
attendance 
Regular 
visits to 
healthcare 
centers to 
monitor 
children   
& family 
health 
checkup 
records  
Streamline of 
eligibility 
determination 
and related 
program rules 
to reduce 
level of 
ambiguity  
Establish 
hotlines to 
receive 
complaints 
of families 
on non-
compliance 
issues  
If families 
refuse to 
comply 
with 
conditions, 
a family 
will be 
excluded 
from the 
program  
Make 
regular 
visits by 
social 
workers to 
facilitate 
and 
encourage 
family 
compliance 
Sample 
selections 
of cases for 
independent 
monitoring 
of  
outcomes to 
detect 
problems 
Cross-
check of 
compliance 
from 
supplier of 
service  
Mean 2.42 3.24 3.27 2.88 3.61 2.88 2.42 2.61 
Median 1.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 1.00 3.00 
Mode - 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
Sum 80.00 107.00 108.00 95.00 119.00 95.00 80.00 86.00 
 
Providing that this is the first time that a group of measures are almost indicated as used 
and effective which probably could be translated into more interest by program administration to 
focus on compliance stage, since that is an essential element of the program. The literature calls 
attention to another aspect of the importance of detection measures, which is that some families 
would try to provide fraudulent information on their compliance or involve program staff in 
corrupt actions at this stage in order to move into the cash disbursing stage and get the money.   
 
Focus group discussion with Egyptian social workers adds more clarification on this point as 
follows: 
 The monthly visits helps to discover cases of fraud by 
family on crowding, number of rooms, social status 
 The contract signed with families confirm that there will 
be gradual deduction from cash transferred as one way 
to penalize families that do not comply with program 
conditionality 
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 Investigation of families‘ withdrawal reasons would help 
to identify measures needed to strengthen the program, 
such as a need to fill in missing services. 
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Examining of measures that have been used to prevent EFC at cash disbursement stage Covered 
by questions # 27 
Figure 14: Preventive measures used at cash disbursing stage 
 
This stage, which relates to whether respondents apply prevention measures at cash 
disbursement stage, shows much more use of direct deposit method and on the other measure of 
―Regular checks by program administration on compliance before cash disbursing, rather 
than later in the process”, there is some favoring the ―use‖ of regular checks on the compliance 
and others to provide that it is ―not using‖ for the same measure.  
Due to its importance, the ―Direct payment to program beneficiaries through direct 
bank deposits” measure scored 66Percent as ―used and highly effective‖. Additional 6 Percent 
―somewhat effective use‖ compose larger support to using direct payment to beneficiaries‘ 
accounts. This is because cash in general considered one of the resources most subject to fraud, 
and corruption actions; thus direct payment to beneficiaries‘ bank accounts better controls cash 
disbursement stage in CCT program.   
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Table 10: Descriptive analysis of prevention measures at cash disbursing stage 
Prevention measures Direct payment to program 
beneficiaries through direct 
bank deposits  
Regular checks by 
program administration 
on compliance before 
cash disbursing,   rather 
than later in the process  
De-link cash 
payments from 
government and 
program staff  
Direct payment to program beneficiaries 
through direct bank deposits  
1   
Regular checks by program 
administration on compliance before cash 
disbursing,   rather than later in the 
process  
0.39 1  
De-link cash payments from government 
and program staff  
0.39 0.45 1 
 
There is positive correlation among the other three prevention measures. Apply the 
measure of “Direct payment to program beneficiaries through direct bank deposits” reduces 
the risk of fraud governmental official or post offices employees since it provide the cash 
through secured channels to beneficiaries. In addition, it lowers the transaction cost in payment 
process through reducing the total number of employees required to handle the cash to 
beneficiaries. 
 
  The second measure of   ―Regular checks by program administration on compliance 
before cash disbursing, rather than later in the process” would support efforts to mitigate 
error occurrence through the payment process and till it reached the beneficiaries. This would 
work as filtration process to cases may not comply or involved in risks of providing wrong data 
about their compliance, participated in fraud actions, or intentionally make corrupted actions.  
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  ―De-link cash payments from government and program staff” is one of the crucial 
measures to avoid fraud and corruption because the existence of intermediate person in the 
payment process giving a chance for bribing or pay to ghost persons. Also, this measure is 
considered an indicator on program quality in accuracy of processing and payments.   
Examining of measures that have been used to detect EFC at cash disbursement stage Covered 
by questions # 28 
 
Figure 15: Detection measures used at cash disbursing stage 
 
These groups of measures (seven measures) are applied in order to detect EFC at the cash 
disbursing stage. On the top of the measures that were applied ―Use national IDs in 
verifying the payment process to match data of beneficiaries and improve detection 
efforts” by percentage of 56Percent , this is one of the most measures to verify the payment 
process and investigate who gets what and how much money disbursed. There might be low 
level of ATM‘s available everywhere, so that this may explain low use of automatic teller 
machines in delivering the payment. Some countries, especially in South Africa, uses armed 
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forces to protect cash vehicles while it moves between villages because lack of local banks or 
post offices. Others use finger prints instead of ID‘s as method of verifying cash deliver by 
using ATM‘s. One of the advanced features that were applied in CCT piloting project in 
Egypt is the use of national IDs ―bitaqa‖ in the payment and verification process and use if 
ATM‘s by poor families. 
 
The following measures are applied and marked as used with high effectiveness: 
 Reconcile payment transfers with actual payments on a regular basis 
 Have national accounts audited by an external audit institution  
 Monitor uncollected payments to gain information on the quality of controls and 
validate CCT cash payments 
 Collaborate to monitor cash flow by involving national and external audit units 
 Review of benefit claims on randomly, or risk basis  
The above group of measures covers two types of detection strategies (The World Bank, 2010): 
Intelligence: by empowering program staff to refer cases of EFC to specialized people 
from independent audit bodies. Also, improve the joint effort with other governmental 
units and ministries. 
Investigation: by introducing cases of EFC to independent review that looks at all facets 
of a case and provide recommendation that would support the program in designing 
controls. As well, it introduces methodology to apply guidance to how to conduct 
investigation on EFC indicators such monitoring un-collected cash. 
 
Only two measures were used slightly and not used in large compared to other measures: 
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 Review of benefit claims on randomly, or risk basis; This 
measure may not be used because it‘s costly to identify risk 
groups and it needs more investment in IT solutions. 
 Monitor reports of ATM cards lost or stolen as a signal of 
possible fraud; since its one of difficult measures to detect use 
of ATM cards, 47Percent not use it at all and 20Percent use it 
with high effective and somewhat effective. Also, missing of 
collaboration among service providers of cash, such banks, and 
program administration.   Especially that bank doesn‘t involve 
in transaction that may lead to disclose its customer‘s 
confidentiality. Finally, this special arrangement may not be 
applicable in some programs as it may be against law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation analysis provides that six out of the seven measures have positive significant correlation 
and moving toward a control system to detect EFC at cash disbursing stage.   
Table11: Correlation analysis between detection measures at cash disbursing stage 
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Review of benefit claims on 
randomly, or risk basis  
1       
Monitor reports of ATM 
cards lost or stolen as a 
signal of possible fraud  
0.60 1      
Collaborate to monitor cash 
flow by involving national 
and external audit units  
0.43 0.38 1     
Use national IDs in verifying  
the payment process to 
match data of beneficiaries 
and improve detection 
efforts  
0.54 0.26 0.66 1    
Reconcile payment transfers 
with actual payments on a 
regular basis  
0.46 0.28 0.57 0.29 1   
Have national accounts 
audited by an external  audit 
institution  
0.37 0.16 0.55 0.41 0.56 1  
Monitor uncollected 
payments to gain 
information on the quality of 
controls and validate CCT 
cash payments  
0.35 0.32 0.58 0.42 0.59 0.29 1 
 
It‘s worthy to note that the mean of the six measures are equally distributed and that refer 
to equal tendency to use them all to detect and control EFC at the cash disbursing stage.   
 
Cross-Tabbing analysis :  
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A grouping to the participants according to their geographic area (Latin America‘s , 
Africa, Asia, and Europe countries) have been tested to make cross-tabbing analysis to check on 
whether they may be variance application of control mechanisms according to the regions. It has 
been found that the collected data points and variability within regions were not conducive to 
reaching useful findings. Future studies with larger samples could explore these differences 
further. 
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Emailing program experts and scholars found to add useful information about EFC mitigation 
methods that works. The following short messages have been received: 
 
A few numbers of experts have been communicated through e-mails to enquire about common 
types of errors, fraud, and corruption. Also, the emailing was enquiring about their personnel 
visions on how to mitigate these types of risks. Some preferred to be anonyms and other 
approves to prevail their identity. Their comments were valuable and useful to this research. 
   
According to Professor (A), the common risks that may face CCT programs as follows:  
―There are errors of under-inclusion where eligible people are not selected and errors of 
over inclusion where non-poor households are selected. Selection involves three 
activities: information about the program, eligibility tests, and registration. People who 
should be included might not know about a program, or their may know but they believe 
wrongly that they are not eligible or the test is applied wrongly by the program agency, 
and they may know and know they are eligible but they are not able to register because 
they don't have identity cards or other documentation or because they cannot reach the 
registration location. I guess the most 'famous' cases are situations in which groups are 
excluded because of racial, ethnic, gender or class actors. The best way of reducing error 
is by acting on all three activities.‖ 
 
Professor (A) has an experience as Senior Researcher and Research Coordinator for Insecurity, 
Risk and Vulnerability-Chronic Poverty Research Centre provided his experience on inclusion 
and exclusion error since these types of errors commonly exist in CCT programs. Government 
efforts to achieve transparency and facilitate issuing identification for poor families who do not 
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have ID‘s will solve part of the program. Accurate targeting mechanisms and awareness sessions 
on the program terms and conditions will also support the success of the program. 
 
Professor (A) adds; 
 ―Fraud arises because the program agencies have too much discretion in the management 
of the program. The Unemployed Heads of Household Program in Argentina did not have 
effective eligibility tests because of the emergency at the time in that country; however ex 
post assessments suggested the program was reasonably well targeted… 
The best way of dealing with fraud is to restrict the discretion of program agencies, 
ensure processes are transparent, and the agencies are accountable‖. 
 
Lessen the discretion in CCT program is discussed in many literature and discretion has been 
consider as a reasons behind a higher level of fraudulent actions. Ensuring accountability to 
program members (staff, beneficiaries, officials) will reduce fraud action. In addition, 
transparency in targeting is a high priority for effective implementation. 
 
Finally, Professor (A) concluded that: 
 ―Corruption is unusual in cct‘s because transfers are fairly transparent and financial 
controls make it harder to appropriate funds. Nevertheless it does happen at the local 
level. Manipulation by beneficiaries to secure transfers or by program agencies to divert 
funds is the main sources of corruption... 
The best way of addressing corruption is to ensure financial control and supervision, do 
random tests, and keep centralized lists of beneficiaries‖ 
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Another professor (B); added 
 
―Error caused by poor work ethic, incompetence on job; fraud: by greed/corruption; 
corruption: sudden access to funds not accessible under the former system‖  
 
Professor (B) suggested that in order to avoid these types of risk there should be mechanisms that 
work to instill a better work ethic among the program team. 
 
Third, is Professor (C) who shares same causes of EFC with the other two professors:  
―The causes of corruption in any CCT system always link to the same issue – that of 
discretion (i.e. the ability to choose between individuals). As soon as you give discretion 
to an individual to make decisions, no matter how tightly drawn your rules are, that 
person will always be able to choose how to apply the rules. The official may then 
receive money from an applicant, or may make a decision according to the political 
allegiance of the applicant – so in many cases it is not poverty but ability to pay a bribe, 
or hold the right political party card which makes the difference.‖ 
 
―Regarding fraud, any system which is conditional enables applicants to cheat the system. 
We see this in the benefit system in the UK, where it has been impossible to eliminate 
fraud – so people will claim unemployment benefit while having a job (or in some cases, 
several jobs!). It is difficult to say how widespread this problem is in any country‖ 
Professor (C) sees the solution as follows  
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―The most workable measure to mitigate errors as far as pensions goes is to have a 
universal transfer. In other words everybody receives the pension, with age as the only 
qualification. If the objection to this is that people who don‘t ―need‖ a pension will still 
receive one, the government has the option of taxing the pensions of more wealthy 
recipients. So poor people get 100Percent untaxed pensions, whereas the wealthiest pay 
(for example) 90Percent tax on the pension.‖ 
 
―This system removes all discretion, except proof of age. It still has drawbacks, 
especially in countries where older people do not have birth certificates. There are ways 
round this – for example, HelpAge in some countries has assisted older people to get 
recognition of their age from the law courts‖  
 
Professor (C) summing up his vision on what are workable measures for CCT controls: 
―So the most workable measure is (as always) to simplify the system. The more 
complicated the system, the more you give opportunities for both officials and recipients 
to break the rules. Even where they don‘t, systems with many rules are also more prone 
to mistakes and inefficiencies. Universal systems are not perfect, but they do eliminate 
many of the problems of conditional transfer.‖ 
 
 
Professor (D) introduces a very good equation for causes of fraud and corruption 
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―The more discretion is, the more opportunity for fraud. And the amount of discretion is a 
function of how clear the rules are, and how many people have decision-making power, 
with respect to who does and does not become a beneficiary, how many people can get 
access to the funds, and what kinds of controls there [are] on each of these points.  
Unclear rules + many people able to make decisions about who becomes a 
beneficiary + few controls to make sure rules are followed = lots of room for 
discretion, which means the CCT program, will be used to reward political 
allies/voters/cousins etc. Similarly, if funds are handled by many officials and controls 
are weak, money will in all likelihood disappear.‖ 
 
 
Most of the provided mechanisms are justified by experts and scholars; however some of the 
provided solution may not be applicable due to constrained funds or due to pre- requisite needs 
of administration capacity or social considerations. 
 
  
` 
           Page 108 
 
CHAPTER SIX: Study Findings 
 
The following findings were reached thorough examination and analysis of the previous 
data and answer the main research and investigative sub-questions of this thesis. Also, other 
findings of challenges that may face the implementation of conditional cash transfer on large 
scales have been reached through a number of interviews and focus group discussions 
 
Challenges facing implementation of CCT in Upper Egypt: 
It should be noted that the challenges facing the CCT in Upper Egypt are differ from that in Ain 
El-Serra due to the following factors:: 
o Geographically:  Ain El-Serra is a slum urban area, whereas in Upper Egypt the program 
is targeting 65 villages located in rural areas. 
o Identification of poor areas: in Ain El-Serra it was much easier than in Upper Egypt 
because the poor slum areas in greater Cairo had already been identified by a 
Geographical and Information System (GIS) study by Dr.Zinab Khedr while in upper 
Egypt there was not easy to identify boundaries of areas suffering from poverty, which is 
widespread throughout upper Egypt (El Saadany, 2011). 
Political Challenges: 
As noted in the Egyptian context, some policy makers may resist geographical targeting set by 
the government and put pressure in favor of some villages that are located outside the target area 
but inside their parliamentary district. (A: field work expert, 2010).   
 
Economic Challenges: 
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The opportunity cost for families to send their children to schools and have health 
checkups for their children should be equal to or less than zero when compared to sending 
children to work; otherwise those families will compare between the amount of cash transfer and 
the amount of wages which their children could earn if they work. Unless there are other points 
of attraction to families who see that educating their children and keeping them healthy is worth 
the sacrifice of income from work, families will choose not to participate. So, the idea is to 
incentivize families to pay for short term high opportunity cost and long term financial benefits 
of educate their children. 
Administration Challenges: 
One of the challenges that face CCT implementation in Egypt is that to train social 
workers on how to contact poor families, explain the CCT program terms and its goals, and 
encourage them to participate in the program. To do that, it is important to understand the poor 
family‘s needs, direct those families to service providers, and encourage families to use their 
rights to get the services.  
Improving wellbeing of families with regards to access to education, health, and nutrition 
is one of the strong challenges to social workers.  (Sholakamy, Piloting CCT in Egypt, 2010). 
Fiscal pressures prevent increasing the number of social workers, and thus may limit their ability 
to reach all eligible beneficiaries and to offer adequate counseling and follow up on the services 
provided to the recipients. 
The need for monitoring, performance benchmarking, and stakeholder consultations is 
very important to implement CCT program in Egypt. To protect for Error, Fraud, and Corruption 
(EFC), there should be tightened polices and procedure, policy for monitoring, evaluation, and 
correction separated from the responsibilities for delivery of cash and services to protect from 
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corruption, setting and clarification of fraud detection system to discover beneficiary or staff 
fraud, and ensure that there is a solid process audit to protect from errors (Dennis, 2010).     
 
Examination of control mechanisms provided by global experts: 
Upon examination of the data obtained on control and accountability mechanisms used 
by CCT program experts, and after analyzing the correlation between those measures, the 
following major findings were reached on Prevention, Detection, and Deterrence mechanisms:  
 
Prevention measures  
These groups of measures were used successfully in the three stages. Most of the 
emphasis in prevention of benefit fraud and error in CCT programs is placed on the 
following: 
 Design a stage of data collection process to identify 
cases 
 Begin with a mapping of the community 
 Involve civil society organizations in the program 
design   
 Use IT systems in the verification of proof of eligibility 
against national databases 
 Train program staff on mechanisms to prevent error, 
fraud, and corruption 
 Allocate Government inter-departmental 
responsibilities 
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 Determine the nature of the problems facing families 
and support the families 
 Direct payments to program beneficiaries through 
direct bank deposits 
 Make regular checks by program administration on 
compliance before cash disbursing, rather than later in 
the process 
 De-link cash payments from government and program 
staff 
Feedback obtained from focus group discussions with local social workers in Egypt, 
indicated that there is lack of sufficient cooperation with regard to education and health services 
for children and poor families, making support to families and follow-up on conditionality more 
difficult.  
 
On the focus group discussion:  although the social workers agreed on the importance of 
most of the above measures of preventions, they raised objections to involving civil society 
organization in the designing of eligibility criteria as preventive action against EFC. Their 
concern is that some of civil society organizations in Egypt have it own goals that may not be 
aligned with those goals of CCT program. Also, may open doors for more discretion in the 
program as they will judge on families‘ eligibility. 
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Less extensive emphasis has been given to the following measures to strengthen prevention of 
EFC: 
a) Warning or punishing of families that bribe program officials to falsely 
confirm compliance with program conditionality 
b) Warning and punishing school officials who provide wrong compliance 
verification. 
c) Warning and punishing health workers who provide wrong compliance 
verification 
The above measures have been added by this study to the World Bank toolkit to control EFC in 
CCT programs as an additive to World Bank application to see whether it could work  
 
This is one of the important findings of this study. The success of CCT program to 
achieve its main goals, as discussed earlier, depends to large extent on the coordination and clear 
lines of authority and accountability between institutions providing such services.  
Considerations to control error may be differ from those for fraud and corruption;  for example 
the actions that include error might be avoided by implementing simple administration 
prevention measures while fraud and corruption may require more structured measures and more 
verification actions. 
 
Preventive measures in the long run have a low cost in terms of resources and efforts as 
they protect the program from leakage in public resources. For instance preventive measures of 
direct cash payments to beneficiaries reduce errors when processing cash.   
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Training program staff members on how to identify EFC is a very important tool to 
reduce error, fraud, and corruption and it would help staff to do better job.  
The study finds that, although the CCT program in Egypt has only been launched in a pilot 
version, there will be a need in future expansions o f the program for more attention to 
communication and enforcement of the cooperation protocol to organize cooperation between 
CCT program administration with Ministry Of Education and Ministry Of Health.  
 
Detection measures  
Most of which were used successfully in the three stages. The main detection 
activities that were used by CCT programs are as follows: 
 Implement systems to facilitate data matching of the 
participant families across different data sources. 
 Recertify eligibility periodically to detect fraudulent 
actions 
 Make thorough cross-checks of registries to detect 
inconsistencies. 
 Make regular visits to schools to monitor children 
school attendance 
 Make regular visits to healthcare centers to monitor 
children and family health checkup records 
 Establish hotlines to receive complaints of families on 
non-compliance issues 
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 Streamline eligibility determination and related 
program rules to reduce level of ambiguity 
 Exclude families from the program if they refuse to 
comply with conditions 
 Make regular visits by social workers to facilitate and 
encourage family compliance 
 Select a sample of cases for independent monitoring of 
outcomes to detect problems 
 Cross-check compliance with suppliers of service 
 Collaborate to monitor cash flow by involving national 
and external audit units 
 Use national IDs in verifying the payment process to 
match data of beneficiaries and improve detection 
efforts 
 Reconcile payment transfers with actual payments on a 
regular basis 
 Have national accounts audited by an external audit 
institution 
 Monitor uncollected payments to gain information on 
the quality of controls and validate CCT cash payments 
 
Two other measures were not supported by the respondents:   
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a) Focus eligibility checks on high-risk groups:  It may be that this step is 
technically difficult to apply since identification of high risk groups (risk 
profiling) within highly dispersed communities is a difficult process and needs 
considerable resources in the field.   
b) Monitor reports of ATM cards lost or stolen as a signal of possible fraud:  It 
may be difficult to implement since it needs special arrangement with banks and, 
in any case, it is not applicable in all programs and may not match local laws and 
regulations. 
c)  Review benefit claims on random or risk basis:  35Percent responded that this 
measure is not used, while 37Percent applied this measure and 28Percent did not 
know about it. 
The above measure has been added by this study to the World Bank toolkit to 
control EFC in CCT programs as an additive to WB application to test whether it 
could work  
 
There may be different reasons for that that may require more investigation in future studies. 
Data matching measures, investigation measures, and IT and intelligent solutions are all effective 
measures as provided by experts. These measures will have a variety of mechanisms to create 
standards and tools of investigation to detect EFC and also strengthen the accountability within a 
program.  
 
Deterrence measures 
 The data obtained from the global experts provided that the sanctions that are used 
against those who obtain benefits fraudulently are limited. They reported less effort was 
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directed to penalize the fraud and corruption actions performed by program participants, 
school officials, and health workers.  
Most of the deterrence actions directed by the program managers to: 
 Train staff to ensure they have a clear understanding of 
what constitutes error, fraud, and corruption 
 Establish public awareness campaigns to ensure 
beneficiaries and community members understand how 
the program will deter fraud and corruption 
 Use administrative penalties or formal cautions directed 
to school officials who provide incorrect compliance 
reporting. 
The literature calls that the benefit offices will seek to recover the overpayments identified 
through the courts without an additional penalty or fine. 
 
The related practice, working to strengthen laws and regulations to govern punishments 
for fraud and corruption actions, was given low scores, either not used or not identified or 
known. Other measures that have low scoring as follows: 
 Putting in place strong criminal penalties for fraudulent 
actions by program staff or beneficiaries 
 Strengthening laws and regulations that govern punishment 
for fraud or corruption by program officials 
 Strengthening laws and regulations that govern punishment 
for fraud or corruption by beneficiaries 
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 Use administrative penalties or formal cautions directed to 
school officials who provide incorrect compliance 
It is quite possible that these measures have low scores and the program managers chose 
not to include sanctions because they thought it would scare some people away or lead to 
dishonesty, rather than more compliance.  
The above measures have been added by this study to the World Bank toolkit to control 
EFC in CCT programs as an additive to WB application to determine whether they are 
being used and what are the results.  
 
      The data obtained from focus group discussion confirmed this result.  There is an 
absence of clear legal definitions on what constitute fraud, error, and corruption in the social 
protection system in Egypt.  Thus, there is a limited legal base from which to apply 
sanctions. In addition, the social protection programs have not taken actions against 
employees or beneficiaries, who have taken benefits by fraud or corruption actions. 
 
   In general, most country programs do not use severe sanctions and increased 
levels of prosecutions as a deterrent. There might be variety of reasons on why program 
administration is not for the use of sanction measures; program managers don‘t use it to gain 
more level of trust of participated families in the program. Also, families‘ heads may not 
participate in the program as they have seen potential risks on their family members. 
When comparing the findings of this study with that of World Bank toolkit (Van Stolk, 
2010), it was found that global practice is generally in line with the recommended measures 
for controlling error, fraud, and corruption in CCT programs.  
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     The study findings agrees with the World Bank finding that very limited use of 
deterrence is observed with program administrators being reluctant to apply sanctions to 
fraudulent claims. The deterrence measures that penalize fraud/ corruption by beneficiaries 
and/or officials are not used in an assertive way. Without consideration of clear definition of 
fraud actions in social security programs there will be little legal actions toward those 
participated in fraud and/or corruption actions, and this would affect trust of the participants 
and staff in the program and their willingness to be honest with each other and with the 
program management as well. To sum, legal definitions of fraud needs to be aligned with 
the program policy to mitigate EFC.  
 
   Positive trends on prevention, detection, and deterrence have been emerged from 
the respondents on the use of more advanced verifications tools, awareness sessions, and use 
of IT solutions, cross-checks and direct payment methods. All of these measures support 
good systems to prevent EFC from happening. 
 
      Additional findings include proposed measures by this study on prevention, 
detection, and deterrence measures. The proposed measures especially those related to 
penalties, punishments to fraud, corruption actions may not be applicable to the context of 
the countries covered in this research, and however they may be useful in other context such 
in Egypt.  
Feedbacks from local social workers in Egypt provide that there may be needs for such laws 
or regulation especially when scaling up the program. This study supports this view and 
recommends using these measures based on other countries experiences.  
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   As presented in the data analysis, the data collected on measures of prevention 
and deterrence of both eligibility and compliance answer the first sub-question; what are the 
administrative systems that would comprise a good implementation of conditional cash 
transfer in Egypt?  The measures of prevention and deterrence of cash disbursing answer the 
second sub-question; what are the financial and control systems that would maximize and 
provide the best basis of conditional cash transfer in Egypt? 
 
      The previously mentioned findings therefore provide an answer to the study‘s 
main research question. Based on the data provided from the sample of global experts and 
Egyptian social workers, the prevention, detection, and deterrence measures compose a 
control system that mitigates risks of error, fraud, and corruption when implementing 
conditional cash transfer systems.  
 
  Finally, the results of this study can be applied to CCT program in Egypt. These 
controls could work in Egypt as they were used successfully in other countries‘ programs, 
especially given that there are no local laws or regulations that contradict these measures. 
This research cannot say, however, that these findings apply to all other CCT programs, 
because there may be some measure that would not work in different contexts or might not 
fit with laws and regulation in other countries. Moreover, although there might be an 
underlying assumption that the CCT context everywhere is quite similar and therefore the 
controls suggested would apply, the specific context for error, fraud, corruption actions may 
` 
           Page 120 
 
differ. Additionally, it would be preferable to repeat the survey with a larger sample than 
was feasible within the time and resource constraints faced by the author.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN: Implications of the Findings and Recommendations 
 
The successful implementation of CCT programs depends to large degree on the control 
mechanisms applied to avoid error, fraud, and corruption.  These in turn depend primarily on 
improving the institutional capacity of programs that serve poor communities. The findings of 
this research agree with those recommendations of the World Bank toolkit to control error, fraud, 
and corruption in CCT programs.  This finding supports the study goal of identifying a proper 
control system that is in application in order to use it for CCT program in Egypt. It also finds that 
not all of the recommended measures are in application.  The reasons behind this may need 
additional analysis and investigations to find why these controls are not in place. 
 
Under this chapter, two sections will deal with the study implications and recommendations: 
First section will deal with general recommendations on control mechanisms to mitigate EFC.  
Second section will introduce what Egypt should learn from global experiences?  
General recommendation on control mechanisms to mitigate EFC:  
 
Introducing recommendations on measures to mitigate EFC is very important to reduce 
leakage of public resources. The provided findings introduce useful information about measures 
that are in fact applied. Some of these measures put on the top by majority surveyed, especially 
those measures of prevention at eligibility and cash disbursement. Also, the high support by the 
surveyed to detection measures at compliance stage, since it is very important at this stage to 
detect families compliance to program conditionality to determine whether they will continue 
and passed to cash disbursing or not. Generally, it is important to keep the country context in 
mind.  
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According to the World Bank toolkit, any recommendation for improvement needs to pass 
the test of feasibility, suitability, and acceptability. In other words: 
• How feasible is a recommendation given the institutional architecture and administrative 
capacity of the country; 
• How suitable or effective are the actions to address the particular EFC problem; and 
• How acceptable are these actions likely to be to policy-makers, administrators, the 
claimants and wider stakeholders? 
These three filters are important as ‗good practice‘ is only relevant if it can be applied and 
effective in tackling the EFC problem.  
The measures provided in this research are useful for programs with complex eligibility 
criteria where there is more intend to have higher levels of EFC. Also, the research worked on 
programs that lack of comprehensive strategy to reduce EFC i.e. focus on some control 
mechanisms and missing other controls. The research looks at administrative capacity since it is 
very crucial to the program successful implementation. The capacity has number of aspects that 
are considered when introducing control measures like Staff training, mapping the community, 
and consider design stage to identify cases of EFC. Furthermore, use of IT to verify eligibility is 
part of the program administrative capacity and helped in most of the surveyed countries to 
reduce EFC. 
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What Egypt should learn from global experiences? 
 
  The details obtained from local social workers in Egypt demonstrated that there is a need 
to consider the social worker inputs in the determination of poor families‘ eligibility. They have 
confronted the discussion that, in future, the program eligibility criteria should include section 
for social worker input when determining poor families‘ eligibility. This would balance between 
the current eligibility criteria that focus on community mapping plus other characteristics without 
social workers‘ inspection criteria to define eligible families. On this point different arguments 
by program experts who strongly advise against this. This is exactly the ―discretion‖ that is 
identified as a source of corruption by some experts. 
  In addition, this study supported that there is no way to balance between social workers 
request as to include their inputs in eligibility criteria and costs associated with this option such 
adding supervisor‘s oversight. It will just add to cost of screening, and not necessarily reduce 
corruption.  The real need is to balance the simplicity of the criteria with the problem of 
excluding needy families.  Also, adding social workers inputs will add discretion to the program 
as for identifying families‘ eligibility. 
The co-operation between program administration and governmental institutions, 
especially those providing health and education services, will facilitate the program mission. 
Without this co-operation and co-ordination the program would lose public resources with lower 
achievement of its main goals. For this reason, when scaling the program up in Egypt, 
enforcement of such co-operation through regulations and protocols is a must in order to reach 
desired goals. Findings on this point show a need for interministerial cooperation between 
governmental units where additional and official protocols are needed.  
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Also, a political support of the coordination will improve the process since all the 
governmental units will seek to support the program whenever it has a high degree of support 
from politicians. This wiling of cooperation supported the CCT program in Mexico when the 
support was coming from the president himself (Santiago Levy, 2006)  
Some consideration to eligibility criteria need to be considered when scaling up CCT in 
future in Egypt. Adding child labor in the criteria since it is one of CCT program main goals is to 
educate poor families‘ children and encourage poor families to send their children to schools. 
Although this is one of CCT main goals, it is not taken into consideration in the eligibility 
criteria and it should be included as a sign of poverty.  
Re-consideration of eligibility criteria is recommended. For example, crowding as one of 
the already exists criteria need to be re-considered when determine the families‘ eligibility in 
CCT program. International experts and local social workers have given different examples for 
families excluded from the program because they do not meet the crowding criteria but meet all 
the other eligibility tests. 
The use of computerized systems by the program in verifying data and processing data 
matching measures would support program administration in detection of EFC actions. 
Improvements in technology and using application of new technologies in terms of 
communicating with the public, processing of benefits, making payments to beneficiaries, and 
matching data would largely improve the mechanisms of controls and would also benefit the 
program administration of the beneficiary data management.  Literature on this point refer to that 
the investment in IT solutions over time compensated through reduction in public resources 
saved through EFC reduction. 
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Other challenges to CCT programs, as discussed previously in the literature, and in study 
findings include political, administrative, and economic challenges. These challenges may be 
improved and even work in favor of poor families and program administration if there is good 
implementation of the CCT control mechanisms introduced in this research. Control mechanisms 
on EFC would improve CCT capacity to direct the program resources to target the poor and work 
on improving their economic, educational, and health status. These considerations needs more 
work and studies to evaluate the impact of CCT controls on these challenges.      
Implication on future research includes methods to measure volume of error, fraud, and 
corruption in CCT programs. A mechanism to measure the level of EFC would facilitate the 
comparison between different programs in level of EFC and would help to direct efforts to areas 
where risk of EFC is high in terms of cost and severity.  The scope of future studies could also 
cover how CCT control mechanisms impact the poor families‘ consumption level of program 
public services. Do control mechanisms increase poor families‘ consumption of health services 
or vice versa? How can CCT controls encourage poor families to believe that they have the rights 
to get the governmental services instead of being a passive recipient? 
This gives rise to other important research questions that could be explored in future 
studies including: what are the specific barriers facing CCT implementation in Egypt? How do 
existing policies, rules and procedures limit their success? What policy efforts are being made to 
overcome such barriers and what facilities exist to help CCT program administration to 
overcome such barriers? A final important question to address is whether differences between 
programs in maturity, number of beneficiaries, and budget affect efficiency of the proposed CCT 
control mechanisms?  
` 
           Page 126 
 
Some of the recommendations of this study indicate that a future study can be done 
adopting a different sampling technique that would be based on larger total number of 
respondents. This would better allow for generalization on a larger scale. Better access to 
information can also allow for a more representative sample size to be drawn based on the total 
population figures needed. The scope of this study could also be either expanded within the CCT 
program that is going to be implemented in Upper Egypt on larger scale, or applied when 
designing programs in other countries, taking into consideration their individual characteristics. 
For example, some countries may already have in place a strong system of general systematic 
control mechanisms and would not need to introduce as many CCT-specific measures. Further 
study on these issues could allow us to generalize the results or provide more insights on how 
EFC controls can influence program outcomes. 
 
In conclusion the following chart summarizes the recommended mechanisms that 
constitute a proper control system that could be implemented in CCT program in Egypt. 
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Figure 16: What constitute a proper control system to mitigate EFC in the implementation of CCT
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CHAPTER EIGHT: Summary and Conclusion 
 
Several studies indicate the positive impact of CCT programs on poverty reduction, 
especially when incorporating health and education considerations.  The main goal of CCT 
programs is to provide social protection to poor families who are trapped in the cycle of poverty.  
 
As indicated earlier in the introduction of this research, CCT programs can consume a 
large amount of public resources. In addition, implementation of CCT programs includes various 
types of risk: risk of error, risk of fraud, and risk of corruption. These types of risks represent 
causes of the leakage of the CCT programs resources. In order to avoid risks of EFC and run an 
effective CCT programs, issues of controls must be associated with CCT programs 
implementation. Implementing accountability and control systems cannot completely eliminate 
EFC risks, since there is no system immune from EFC, but it would help to reduce level of EFC 
at CCT program stages. 
 
This research has addressed ways to control the risks associated with error, fraud, and 
corruption facing global CCT programs and identified successful mechanisms that were 
recommended by international organization to mitigate those risks. Specifically, this research has 
clarified the practices actually used in global CCT programs to reduce level of EFC in CCT 
programs.  This information enriches our understanding of such measures and how they can 
strengthen CCT programs, including those in Egypt, since new programs need to benefit from 
other countries‘ experiences before moving forward to scale up CCT.   
The research has found varying levels of application of the tools recommended to mitigate EFC 
introduced in the World Bank toolkit released in 2010. The research both clarifies which tools 
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are in use and the degree of effectiveness as assessed by experts in the field in order to answer 
the central research question:  what constitutes a proper control system in implementing CCT 
program to reduce the risks of EFC?   
In this research different methods of data collection have been used to examine the use of 
mechanisms at each of the program‘s three stages of eligibility, compliance to conditionality, and 
cash disbursing so as to mitigate risks of EFC. The data collected on these control mechanisms 
shows variety and preferences of tools and controls used in CCT programs; some of which were 
more effective in the view of practitioners, while others were not used at all.  Then, in the data 
analysis section, the mechanisms are classified and grouped into three groups: mechanisms used 
to prevent EFC, mechanisms to detect EFC, and mechanisms to deter EFC in CCT programs.   
 
Although the dataset is of limited size, it nonetheless provides valuable information on 
the actual field practice in the application of control mechanisms in CCT programs.   
 
In the findings section of this research, different mitigation strategies were discussed, 
based on those in application in the majority of implemented CCT programs  
The finding shows that deterrence strategies to discourage EFC actions are not in place. 
Little of developed countries apply sanctions since they have clear legal definitions of what 
constitute EFC.  Deterrence actions related to criminalizing fraud actions or penalizing program 
staff for fraud or corruption are not in use except administrative penalties. Being in early phases 
of CCT could explain why CCT program administration don‘t want to discourage families to 
participate in the program be enforcing criminal penalties by law when discovering EFC but in 
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the matured program such in Latin America, there is no clear reason behind freezing such 
penalties. When households do not initially perceive that being involved in EFC would put them 
in jail may encourage them to involve in such action since the penalty is limited to deduction of 
amount of cash or termination from the program. 
Study finding from focus group discussion with Egyptian social workers participated in 
piloting of CCT program in Egypt; bring more attention to intergovernmental co-ordination In 
CCT program. There is lack of clear protocol enforcing this coordination among different parties 
MOE, MOH, and Program administration that represent MOSS. Without an enforcement of 
coordination, CCT program will be a program of financial assistance rather introducing package 
of services to enhance the educational and health status of the poor. In addition, the quality of 
services introduced to poor families should have more studies to ensure it supports program 
goals. Level of quality needs to be addressed to ensure that children are learning important skills 
in critical thinking and creative process learning which are necessary for success in much higher 
income occupations. 
 
To conclude, the goal of this study is to introduce proper control system that could be 
part of the success factor of CCT implementation. At the first sight, successful experience of 
Latin American countries to implement control measures to mitigate EFC might seem to be a 
good example to follow. As well the provided for toolkit tackling EFC is very useful. However, 
it would be extremely challenging if not impossible to apply Latin American and World Bank 
experience to Egyptian context. First of all, important consideration in the Egyptian governments 
should be given to its capability to deliver governmental services. Administration capacity of the 
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program to deliver good design of the program where transparency and methods of verification is 
valid. Other mechanisms for monitoring and oversight are definitely required.  
Another important reason is that program administration and scaling up any program 
requires large amount of resources, especially as the literatures indicates that as much as 20 
percent of monies allotted to conditional cash transfers must be reserved for administrative cost. 
This cost may reach higher than the 20Percent due to weaknesses in the program administrative 
and financial controls. Therefore, if considered the question of effectiveness in program 
administration though control mechanisms still needs more thorough evaluation of what can be 
done to increase efficiency and effectiveness. 
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A. Introduction 
 
This questionnaire is part of my thesis work on Cash Transfer Programs at American University 
in Cairo- Egypt. The questionnaire addresses preventive mechanisms on the overflow of work of 
the implementation of CCT programs. Its purpose is to provide guidance to the implementation 
of CCT in Egypt and to support the researcher’s thesis work. The questionnaire focuses on 
mechanisms applied during each of the three basic stages in the implementation of conditional 
cash transfer at the local level:  
 
I. Determination of family eligibility 
II. Determination of compliance with conditionality requirements  
III. Cash disbursement 
 
I would appreciate if you would take time to fill out the survey below; your feedback is valuable 
to me and to my research outputs. 
 
When answering the questionnaire, you are asked to provide information based on your 
experience and knowledge to the best of your ability.   
 
B. Privacy Statement:  
 
All answers and information given will remain private.  No names of individuals or identifying 
information will appear in the resulting research report.  All data collected will be maintained 
separate from identifying information to preserve individual confidentiality.  No risks of 
participating in this study have been identified.  We very much appreciate your assistance in 
helping Egypt to develop an effective CCT program.   
 
      
      
For further follow up please contact: 
 
American University in Cairo - School of Global Affairs and Public Policy 
Ahmed Fathy Badawy 
Mobile: 010-1640872 
 
Due to time constraints, kindly send responses in electronic format no later than 30
th
 of May, 
2011 to: 
E-mail: a_fathy@aucegypt.edu  
I appreciate if you allow me to send you a reminder on your feedback to my questionaire’s  
 
Kindly naswer the follwoing quesitons: 
 
 Section A : Respondant Background characteristics 
 
 Your Gender :  
o Male 
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o Female 
 
 Your Age: 
o 25-35 
o 35-45 
o 45-55 
o 55-65 
o Over 65 
 
 You experienced CCT through which of the following activities: 
 
o Donor 
o Implementor :– Management  activities 
o Implementor :– Admin. & Finance activities 
o Conducting Field Work 
o Consulting  
o Other, please fill in the space (---------------------)  
 
 
 Your Title:  please specify: (--------------------------------------------------------------------) 
 
  Your role on the process : please specify (------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------) 
 
  
 Section B: Program Background charcterisitcs 
 
 Country of implementation: (-------------------------) 
  
 
 How many phases the paorgram has taken for implementation, please specify (-------
----------------) 
 
 Area in which the CCT program  is implmented  
 
o Rural area 
o Urban area 
o Both in Rural and Urban 
 
 
 Total number of beneficiery household covered by the program (ranges) 
 
o Less than half million beneficiery  
o A million of beneficiries 
o Two million benefciery  
o More than three million beneficiery 
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 Section C: Was any of the following program eligibility criteria used?  
 
1. dwelling unit size  / number of rooms 
o Yes 
o No 
 
2. If yes, what was the criterion? Please specify (--------------) 
 
3. Number of people per room (crowding)  
o Yes 
o No 
 
4. Marital status of the household 
o Yes 
o No 
 
5. If yes, select from the following 
a. Married 
b. Widowed 
c. Divorced 
d. Never married 
e. Sparated 
 
6. Whther a family has children less than 18 years of age   
o Yes 
o No 
 
7. Whther any of the houshold head has a health burden  
o Yes  
o No 
 
8. Whther houshold head is working ?  
o Yes 
o No 
  
9. Whther there is a social security received by houshold  
o Yes 
o No 
 
 
10. Was there an accessibility of the houshold to socail protection schemes 
o Has access to pension schemes for the poor 
o Has no access to pension schemes for the poor 
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11. Whther the family has child labor 
o Yes 
o No 
 
12. If you have other innovative eligibility criteria, please specify (--------,-------------
----,---------------,----) 
 
 
 
 Section D : please select the best answer for the following questions: 
 
 
   
  Not 
used 
Was 
used 
and 
was 
Highly 
effectiv
e  
Was used 
and 
Somewhat 
effective  
Was 
used 
with 
low 
level of 
effective
ness  
Was 
used 
but not 
effectiv
e at all 
Not 
sure/
don’t 
know 
Group 1 : Eligibility 1 5 4 3 2 0 
  
1 In your experience, which of the following measures have been used to discourage   error, fraud, 
and corruption in CCT programs? 
1-1 Training staff to ensure they have a 
clear understanding of what 
constitutes error, fraud, and corruption 
      
1-2 Putting in place strong criminal 
penalties for fraudulent actions by 
program staff or beneficiaries 
      
1-3 Strengthening laws and regulations 
that govern punishment for fraud or 
corruption by beneficiaries 
      
1-4 Strengthening laws and regulations 
that govern punishment for fraud or 
corruption by program officials 
      
1-5 Establish public awareness campaigns 
to ensure beneficiaries and community 
members understand how the program 
will deter fraud and corruption 
      
1-6 Use administrative penalties or formal 
cautions directed to clients who 
provide incorrect compliance 
information. 
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1-7 Use administrative penalties or formal 
cautions directed to school officials 
who provide incorrect compliance 
      
  
2 In your experience, which of the following measures have been used to prevent error, fraud, and 
corruption at the eligibility stage?  
 2-1 Design a stage of data collection 
process to identify cases 
      
 2-2 Begin with a mapping of the 
community  
      
 2-3 Involvement of civil society 
organizations  in the program design  
      
2-4 Use of  IT systems in the verification 
of proves of eligibility against national 
databases 
      
2-5 Training for program staff on 
mechanisms to prevent  error, fraud, 
and corruption 
      
  
3 In your experience, which of the following measures have been used to detect error, fraud, and 
corruption at the eligibility stage?  
3-1 Systems to facilitate data matching of 
the participant families across 
different data sources.  
      
3-2 To focus eligibility checks on high-
risk groups 
      
3-3 Recertify eligibility periodically to 
detect fraudulent actions 
      
3-4 Make thorough cross-checks of 
registries to detect inconsistencies. 
      
 
Group II : Compliance to conditionality during the program 
  
1 In your experience, which of the following measures have been used to prevent error, fraud, and 
corruption at the compliance stage? 
1-1 Allocation of Government inter-
departmental responsibilities 
      
1-2 Determine the nature of the problems 
facing families and support the family 
      
1-3 Warning or punishing  of families that 
bribe program officials to falsely 
confirm compliance with program 
conditionality 
      
1-4 Warning and punishing school 
officials who provide wrong 
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compliance verification. 
1-5 Warning and punishing health workers 
who provide wrong compliance 
verification. 
      
  
2 In your experience, which of the following measures have been used to detect error, fraud, and 
corruption at the compliance stage?  
 2-1 Regular visits to schools  to monitor 
children  school attendance   
      
 2-2 Regular visits to healthcare centers to 
monitor children   & family health 
checkup records 
      
 2-3 Streamline of eligibility determination 
and related program rules to reduce 
level of ambiguity  
      
2-4 Establish hotlines to receive 
complaints of families on non-
compliance issues 
      
2-5 If families refuse to comply with 
conditions, a family will be excluded 
from the program 
      
2-6 Make regular visits by social workers 
to facilitate and encourage family 
compliance 
      
2-7 Sample selections of cases for 
independent monitoring of  outcomes 
to detect problems 
      
2-8 Cross-check of compliance from 
supplier of service 
      
    
Group III :  Cash disbursement methods    
  
1 In your experience, which of the following measures have been used to prevent error, fraud, and 
corruption at the cash disbursement stage? 
1-1 Direct payment to program 
beneficiaries through direct bank 
deposits  
      
1-2 Regular checks by program 
administration on compliance before 
cash disbursing,   rather than later in 
the process 
      
1-3 De-link cash payments from 
government and program staff 
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2 In your experience, which of the following measures have been used to detect error, fraud, and 
corruption at the cash disbursement stage?  ? 
 2-1 Review of benefit claims on 
randomly, or risk basis  
      
 2-2 Monitor reports of ATM cards lost or 
stolen as a signal of possible fraud  
      
 2-3 Collaborate to monitor cash flow by 
involving national and external audit 
units 
      
2-4 Use national IDs in verifying  the 
payment process to match data of 
beneficiaries and improve detection 
efforts 
      
2-5 Reconcile payment transfers with 
actual payments on a regular basis 
      
2-6 Have national accounts audited by an 
external  audit institution 
      
2-7 Monitor uncollected payments to gain 
information on the quality of controls 
and validate CCT cash payments 
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A. Introduction 
 
This questionnaire is part of my thesis work on Cash Transfer Programs at American University 
in Cairo- Egypt . It addresses preventive mechanisms on the overflow of work of the 
implementation of CCT programs. The questionnaire focuses on mechanisms applied during 
each of the three basic stages in the implementation of conditional cash transfer at the local level:  
 
I. Determination of family eligibility 
II. Determination of compliance with conditionality requirements  
III. Cash disbursement 
 
When answering the questionnaire, you are asked to provide information based on your 
experience and knowledge to the best of your ability.   
 
 
B. How to answer the questionnaire 
 
When answering the questionnaire, you are asked to provide your  views on how best to 
implement conditional cash transfer programs in Egypt in the future on a larger scale, based on 
the experience in the pilot project, your  professional knowledge, and to the best of your  ability. 
 
On the following pages is a list of items that may be used to support a good system to implement 
CCT program.  This is not a test of your knowledge or an assessment of the pilot program.  It 
simply asks you for your advice on how to implement a good control system in the future, based 
on your knowledge of these programs and your knowledge of Egypt. 
 
C. Time Allocation:  
 
Please allot 20 minutes for answering this questionnaire.  
 
D. Privacy Statement:  
 
All answers and information given will remain private.  No names of individuals or identifying 
information will appear in the resulting research report.  All data collected will be maintained 
separate from identifying information to preserve individual confidentiality.  No risks of 
participating in this study have been identified.  We very much appreciate your assistance in 
helping Egypt to develop an effective CCT program.  No information on your individual 
answers, your name, or contact information will be provided to anyone for any purpose. 
 
 
 
E. DIRECTIONS:  
 
i. READ each item carefully.  
 
ii. THINK about different measures described by the item.  
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iii. DECIDE whether that measure is  : 
Strongly 
Agree  
Agree   Undecided Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Not 
sure/don’t 
know 
 
iv. DRAW A CIRCLE around one of the six options following the item to show the answer 
you make.  
      
      
For further follow up please contact: 
 
American University in Cairo - School of Global Affairs and Public Policy 
Ahmed Fathy Badawy 
Mobile: 010-1640872 
 
Due to time constraints, kindly send responses in hard copy or electronic format no later than 15 
May, 2011 to: 
E-mail: a_fathy@aucegypt.edu  
 
Kindly naswer the follwoing quesitons: 
 
 Section A : Respondant Background characteristics 
 
 Your Gender :  
o Male 
o Female 
 
 Your Age: 
o 25-35 
o 35-45 
o 45-55 
o 55-65 
o Over 65 
 
 You experienced CCT through which of the following activities: 
 
o Donor 
o Implementor :– Management  activities 
o Implementor :– Admin. & Finance activities 
o Field Work 
o Consulting  
o Other, please fill in the space (---------------------)  
 
 
 Your Title:  please specify: (--------------------------------------------------------------------) 
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  Your role on the process : please specify (------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------) 
 
  
 Section B: Program Background charcterisitcs 
 
 Countryof implementation: (-------------------------) 
  
 
 
 Area in which the CCT program  is implmented  
 
o Rural area 
o Urban area 
 
 
 Total number of beneficiery household covered by the program (ranges) 
 
o Less than half million beneficiery  
o A million of beneficiries 
o Two million benefciery  
o More than three million beneficiery 
 
 How long the program take for implementation? 
 
o 1-3 years 
o 4-6 years 
o More than 6 years  
o Other ; please specify (-------------------) 
 
 Section C: Was any of the following program eligibility criteria used?  
 
1. dwelling unit size  / number of rooms 
o Yes 
o No 
 
2. If yes, what was the criterion? Please specify (--------------) 
 
3. Number of people per room (crowding)  
o Yes 
o No 
 
4. Marital status of the household 
o Yes 
o No 
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5. If yes, select from the following 
a. Married 
b. Widowed 
c. Divorced 
d. Never married 
e. Sparated 
 
6. Whther a family has children less than 18 years of age   
o Yes 
o No 
 
7. Whther any of the houshold head has a health burden  
o Yes  
o No 
 
8. Whther houshold head is working ?  
o Yes 
o No 
  
9. Whther there is a social security received by houshold  
o Yes 
o No 
 
 
10. Was there an accessibility of the houshold to socail protection schemes 
o Has access to pension schemes for the poor 
o Has no access to pension schemes for the poor 
 
 
11. Whther the family has child labor 
o Yes 
o No 
 
12. If you have other innovative eligibility criteria, please specify (--------,-------------
----,---------------,----) 
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 Strongly 
Agree  
Agree   Undecided Disagr
ee 
Strongly 
disagree 
Not 
sure/don’
t know 
 Section One : 
Social Workers  
5 4 3 2 1 0 
A Which of the following measures do you agree would help social workers improve their 
ability to screen families? 
A-1 More detailed 
guidelines on 
eligibility 
      
A-2 More training for 
social workers 
      
A-3 Detailed manuals 
that social workers 
can follow 
      
A-4 More briefing for 
beneficiaries on 
eligibility 
      
A-5 More supervision to 
catch errors 
      
A-6 Revisiting families 
every 3 months to 
confirm eligibility 
      
B Which of the following measures do you agree would improve the ability to determine 
eligible families? 
B-1 The civil society 
organizations to 
share in setting the 
design of  program 
eligibility  
      
B-2 To provide 
participants with 
more information 
and  training so that 
eligibility criteria are 
clearly understood 
by applicants 
      
B-3 Use technology to 
match the data 
provided by the 
participant families 
to official 
government 
databases more 
quickly and 
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thoroughly.  
B-4 Introduce more 
verification 
measures as the 
program expands, to 
be prevent families 
from presenting 
inaccurate 
information to gain 
access to benefits 
      
B-5 Communicate the 
program requirement 
to poor families to 
reduce the instances 
of poor families who 
are eligible but 
excluded because 
they do not 
understand what 
information to 
present  
      
B-6 Include incentives to 
social workers  who 
make  efforts to 
prevent  fraud, or 
corruption in the 
program 
      
B-7 Take measures to 
avoid incorrect 
eligibility 
determinations that 
diverge from the 
program rules 
      
C Which of the following measures do you agree it would improve families’ compliance to 
the program conditionality? 
C-1 Provide informative 
sessions to poor 
families on 
compliance to 
encourage them to 
meet the 
requirements  
      
C-2 Avoid any 
ambiguity in the 
conditionality 
criteria to make it 
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easy for families to 
comply to the 
conditionality 
C-3 Conduct regular 
visits by social 
workers to facilitate 
and encourage 
participating 
families to comply 
      
C-4 Recertify family 
eligibility to 
determine if families 
remain eligible and 
to avoid fraudulent 
actions 
      
C-5 Provide a range of 
penalties for families 
who are not in 
compliance, begin 
by warnings up to 
termination from the 
program   
      
C-6 Increase checks to 
reduce fraud by 
claimants in 
compliance 
      
C-7 Analyze the causes 
of dropout rates after 
registration and 
determine why it is 
not attractive to 
some families to 
comply to the 
program 
requirements 
      
C-8 Develop a complaint 
system  to resolve 
beneficiary problems 
with program 
administration 
      
C-9 Improve 
Government inter-
departmental co-
operation to enhance 
the compliance 
verification 
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procedures  
D Which of the following measures do you agree would improve the CCT program 
procedures for making payments to participants who comply with the conditionality? 
D-1 Ensure there is 
transparency in the 
payment process to 
fight corruption 
      
D-2 Delink cash 
payments from 
government and 
program social staff 
      
D-3 Make direct 
payment to 
beneficiaries bank 
accounts 
      
D-4 Use national ID- 
bitaqua in verifying  
payment process to 
match data on 
beneficiaries and 
improve detection of 
wrong payments 
      
D-5 Using  IT solutions  
(such as ATM cards) 
in the payment 
process to reduces 
opportunities for 
theft or diversion 
      
D-6 Impose criminal 
penalties for fraud 
such as payment to 
ghost beneficiaries  
      
D-7 Monitor uncollected 
payments to gain 
information on 
whether controls and 
systems are working 
      
D-8 Audit accounts at the 
program level 
audited by an 
external  audit 
institution  
      
 
What are other innovative methods you suggested to improve the program implementation 
in Egypt? Please specify 
 
1 of 3
Conditional Cash Transfer in Egypt: What Can 
Constitute a good implementation controls? 
Your Job Title
 
Response 
Count
 
47
 answered question 47
 skipped question 7
2 of 3
Page 2, Q4.  Your Job Title
1 Manager of Beneficiaries an Money Transfers May 27, 2011 3:09 AM
2 Monitoring and Evaluation Manager May 25, 2011 8:10 PM
3 Policy Specialist May 24, 2011 10:48 PM
4 Program Coordinator May 24, 2011 11:28 AM
5 Associate Professor at the A.U.C. and Cairo University May 22, 2011 3:56 PM
6 Professor May 22, 2011 2:33 PM
7 Former Director Of Operations of Solidarity Program, Health Sector Consultant,
Social Cabinet Of Dominican Republi
May 21, 2011 1:21 AM
8 Coordinadora Unidad de Promoción y Desarrollo Social May 20, 2011 11:27 PM
9 Senior economist May 20, 2011 6:53 PM
10 Assistant Professor May 20, 2011 5:00 PM
11 International consultant May 19, 2011 4:51 PM
12 Technical Director of the Social Policies Cabinet, Dominican Republic. May 19, 2011 4:45 PM
13 Senior Research Fellow May 19, 2011 9:54 AM
14 researcher May 18, 2011 10:18 PM
15 Professor May 18, 2011 8:33 PM
16 Social Protection Specialist May 18, 2011 8:20 PM
17 Prof May 18, 2011 11:47 AM
18 Social Protection Specialist May 18, 2011 11:44 AM
19 Advisor May 18, 2011 10:35 AM
20 Researcher May 18, 2011 10:13 AM
21 Professor May 18, 2011 7:47 AM
22 Professor of Economcis May 18, 2011 6:56 AM
23 Professor May 18, 2011 2:58 AM
24 General Coordinator May 18, 2011 12:01 AM
25 Sector Manager (currently -- not when advising on CCT) May 17, 2011 6:07 AM
26 Monitoring and Evaluation Officer May 17, 2011 5:29 AM
27 assistant professor May 17, 2011 1:22 AM
28 Senior Researcher May 17, 2011 12:25 AM
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Page 2, Q4.  Your Job Title
29 Consultant May 16, 2011 7:33 PM
30 Senior Researcher May 16, 2011 7:28 PM
31 Professor Emeritus May 16, 2011 11:00 AM
32 Social Policy Specialist May 16, 2011 10:08 AM
33 General Director Programming and Budget, Ministry of Finance. Treasurer of
Mexico, Ministry of Finance. Consultant.
May 15, 2011 9:46 PM
34 Researcher May 15, 2011 11:14 AM
35 Executive Director May 14, 2011 5:47 AM
36 Director of Evaluation of Oportunidades in Mexico May 13, 2011 10:17 PM
37 Senior Consultant, Halcrow Group Ltd, London UK May 13, 2011 7:47 PM
38 Economist May 13, 2011 6:00 PM
39 Senior Economist May 13, 2011 5:54 PM
40 Associate Professor May 13, 2011 12:34 PM
41 Economist May 13, 2011 2:43 AM
42 Project Manager May 13, 2011 1:35 AM
43 Coordinator - Strategic Addressing Unit May 12, 2011 11:59 PM
44 Researcher May 12, 2011 6:56 PM
45 Director May 12, 2011 9:17 AM
46 Chief Economist May 12, 2011 3:58 AM
47 President, Social Assessment, LLC May 12, 2011 2:27 AM
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Conditional Cash Transfer in Egypt: What Can 
Constitute a good implementation controls? 
Your role on the CCT prograam
 
Response 
Count
 
46
 answered question 46
 skipped question 8
2 of 4
Page 2, Q5.  Your role on the CCT prograam
1 Adminsitration of program beneficiaries an money transfers, administration of
information technologies (IT)
May 27, 2011 3:09 AM
2 Follow the actions and the result indicators May 25, 2011 8:10 PM
3 External researcher May 24, 2011 10:48 PM
4 The principal responsibility is to prepare the field logistics for the research
projects conducted by SRC, including participation in the design of interview
schedules, supervision of data collection, and data processing on numerous
projects, in the last three years he is working as a coordinator for the conditional
cash transfer program (CCT) in collaboration with the Ministry of Social Solidarity
in three different governorates (Cairo, Assuit, Sohag).
May 24, 2011 11:28 AM
5 Developing the elegibility criteria May 22, 2011 3:56 PM
6 Design, monitoring, and evaluation May 22, 2011 2:33 PM
7 Former Director Of Operations of Solidarity Program, Health Sector Consultant,
Social Cabinet Of Dominican Republi
May 21, 2011 1:21 AM
8 Coordinadora May 20, 2011 11:27 PM
9 evaluator May 20, 2011 6:53 PM
10 none May 20, 2011 5:00 PM
11 Research, analyzing lessons learned May 19, 2011 4:51 PM
12 The Social Policies Cabinet coordinates the formulation and implementation,
monitoring, follow up and evaluation of all social programs in the DR, including
our CCT Program, Solidaridad.
May 19, 2011 4:45 PM
13 question is unclear May 19, 2011 9:54 AM
14 research activities May 18, 2011 10:18 PM
15 I evaluated a CCT program in Honduras May 18, 2011 8:33 PM
16 Advise Governments on design and implementation of Social Cash Transfer
Programmes
May 18, 2011 8:20 PM
17 academic analysis May 18, 2011 11:47 AM
18 Costing and projection May 18, 2011 11:44 AM
19 Statistical analyse May 18, 2011 10:35 AM
20 Desk Study May 18, 2011 10:13 AM
21 evaluator May 18, 2011 7:47 AM
22 Evaluated effects of CCT programs May 18, 2011 6:56 AM
23 Evaluator May 18, 2011 2:58 AM
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Page 2, Q5.  Your role on the CCT prograam
24 I was part of the designing group of the program, performing research on the
amount of transfers, the mechanism to identify families in poverty. Then I was in
charge of operational planning and evaluation and eventually was the General
Coordinator in charge of directing the program as a whole
May 18, 2011 12:01 AM
25 Technical partner / advisor to program from donor agency, partnering with
Ministry that was operating program (we were financing & providing TA)
May 17, 2011 6:07 AM
26 •	Consolidates and prepares Quarterly, Semestral and Annual Regional
Accomplishment Report  •	Prepare draft Regional Annual Thrusts and Priorities
based on the National thrusts and Priorities  •	Provides technical support in the
preparation of the Regional Work and Financial Plan  •	Provides technical
support in the implementation/conduct of Spot Checks, Impact Evaluation and
other research activities  •	Conduct field monitoring as required by the Regional
director  •	Submits periodic and special reports as needed  •	Recommends
policies and/or strategies pertaining to planning, monitoring and evaluation, and
research as needed  •	Assist in the conduct of Regional PREW  •	Focal person
in updating and maintaining the Regional Internal Monitoring System
May 17, 2011 5:29 AM
27 researcher May 17, 2011 1:22 AM
28 Project manager May 16, 2011 7:33 PM
29 Directed an evaluation project May 16, 2011 7:28 PM
30 What process?  I have participated in a cross-country survey on the impact of
cash transfers on wellbeing and development in poor households
May 16, 2011 11:00 AM
31 manager of the project " Assessment of effectiveness of cash assistance
scheme in Albania"
May 16, 2011 10:08 AM
32 Participation in the design and implementation strategy of CCTs; as well as in
the more general poverty alleviation strategy these programs should be part of,
for Mexico in a very significant role.  For other countries as consultant. In
Mexico, a very  Evaluation. Consultant for different countries and international
organizations.
May 15, 2011 9:46 PM
33 assessment May 15, 2011 11:14 AM
34 User May 14, 2011 5:47 AM
35 Coordinating the impact evaluation from within the CCT program in Mexico's
Oportunidades
May 13, 2011 10:17 PM
36 Reviews if social protection programmes in Asia and the Caribbean May 13, 2011 7:47 PM
37 Project officer May 13, 2011 6:00 PM
38 Designed the CCT system, developed the targeting system, supervised
implementation & national rollout
May 13, 2011 5:54 PM
39 Impact evaluation May 13, 2011 12:34 PM
40 Project Design May 13, 2011 2:43 AM
41 Coordinate project implementation May 13, 2011 1:35 AM
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Page 2, Q5.  Your role on the CCT prograam
42 Monitoring and Evaluation, Finances Planing,  Information System, Citizens
Advice, (complaints, claims, news), Payment Processing
May 12, 2011 11:59 PM
43 Conducting impact evaluation May 12, 2011 6:56 PM
44 Advised World Bank and other governments on cash transfer program design May 12, 2011 9:17 AM
45 Research May 12, 2011 3:58 AM
46 research and coordination May 12, 2011 2:27 AM
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Summary of CCt programs implemented globally 
Ref.# Prog.Name Country Year 
launched 
# of 
beneficiaries in 
latest year 
Total budget Implementing 
org. 
Prog.conditionality Stipend per family 
1 Bolsa Familia Brazil Oct.2003 reach 11.4 million 
families by 2006 
Budget: R$10.4 
billion ($5 
billion) in 2005 
(0.36% of GDP) 
Administrative 
cost: 4% of 
program 
budget 
Government 
through  
decentralized 
federation 
 85 % school 
attendance for 
school age children 
 Update 
immunization cards 
for children up to 
six years old 
 Regular visits to 
health  center for 
breast feeding or 
pregnant women 
R$50 ($42 ppp)/ moth 
each+ every additionl 
child , up to three, or 
pregnant women R$15 
($13ppp) : therefore 
R$95 ($ 91 ppp) is the 
highest amount 
transferred to a family  
1 Chile Solidario Chile May.2002 225,000 Budget: 0.3% of 
social 
protection 
spending 
(0.08% of GDP; 
2005) 
Administrative 
cost: 20% of 
program costs, 
half of that 
being the cost 
of the social 
worker 
accompaniment 
National 
Government 
through social 
solidarity 
investment fund 
in partnership 
with 
municipilalities 
Selection criteria 
based on a score 
derived from Ficha 
CAS-2 , which 
generates a 
multidimensionsl 
ranking index; the 
highr the score , the 
worse is the situation 
of families  
If the family meets the 
target after one year; it’s 
automatically excluded 
from the program. If not 
the value of transfer 
decreases after the first 
year and over the first 
six months started with 
10,500 pesos ($ 33ppp) 
and for the last six 
months ends by 3,716 
pesos ($12ppp) 
1 Oportunidades Mexico 2002 By 2004,  5 million  In 2002 around 
Mex$18 billion 
(US$1.8 billion) 
Government  Selection of 
beneficiary follows 
three stages:  
 Municipilities are 
chosen according 
to an index of 
marginality 
 Households within 
The transfer has three 
basic components two of 
which are conditional 
and third one is 
unconditional: 
 Unconditional transfer 
250 pesos ($ 32 ppp) 
per elderly adult 
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the municipilities 
selected according 
to a socio-
demographic study  
 Feedback received 
from communities 
in order to check 
eligibility 
 Conditional food 
support  by attending 
training session on 
nutrition and health 
equal to 189 pesos ($ 
24 ppp)  
 Conditional 
scholarship to 
children in grades 
between  3 to 12 by 
attending schools and 
health centers with 
amounts ranged 
between 120 pesos ($ 
15 ppp) to 760 pesos 
($ 98 ppp)  
1,855 pesos ($141) is the 
maximum amount that 
household can obtain 
2 Juntos Peru 2005 June 2008 -
453,823 
Budget: S/. 300 
million ($100 
million) in 2006 
(0.11% of GDP) 
Peru- 
Governmental  
institutions 
 Health: Regular 
health visits for 
pregnant women 
and for children 
less than 5 years 
old 
 Education: School 
attendance of at 
least 85% for 
children aged 6–
14 who have not 
completed 
elementary 
education 
 Other: 
Participation in 
the Mi Nombre 
(My Name) 
program by all 
families with 
children who lack 
birth certificates 
and/or are older 
than 18 years and 
have no 
S/.100 ($33) per month 
for 4 years 
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identification card 
 Familias en 
Acción 
Colombia 2001 1.7 million 
households by end 
of 2007 
Budget: $200 
per month 
(0.2% of GDP; 
2007) 
Administrative 
cost: 5.0% of 
program 
budget (1.0% is 
for materials 
related to 
verification of 
compliance), 
plus 3.4% in 
banking 
commissions 
Gov.Presidential 
Agency for 
Social Action 
and 
International 
Cooperation, 
local program 
offices 
 Meet the growth 
control and 
development 
checkups 
scheduled every 2 
months for 
children aged 0–1, 
3 times a year for 
children up to 2 
years, and 2 times 
a year thereafter 
up to 7 years 
 At least 80% 
school attendance 
in a 2-month 
cycle (maximum 
of 8 unjustified 
absences in a 2-
month period) 
Education subsidy: in 
elementary school, 
Col$15,000 per month 
(approximately $8) for 
each minor attending 
grades 2–5in high school, 
Col$25,000–60,000 per 
month (approximately 
$14–33) per minor 
attending grades 6–11 
Health subsidy: 
Col$50,000 per month 
(approximately $3,028) 
per family with members 
less than 7 years 
 Pantawid 
Pamilyang 
Pilipino 
Program (4 
P’s) 
Philippines 2008 Total 
beneficiaries: 
approx. 380,000 
households - Poor 
households in 140 
of the poorest 
municipalities and 
10 cities 
US$ 471 million 
over 5 year 
period (2009-
2013) 
Department of 
Social Welfare 
and 
Development 
acting as 
executing 
agency, in 
partnership 
with 
Departments of 
Health and 
Education 
 Children and 
pregnant women 
attend health 
centers and posts 
to get regular 
preventive health 
check ups and 
immunizations, 
according to the 
Department of 
Health’s protocol 
 Children enroll in 
schools and 
attend over 85% 
of school classes 
Health transfer currently 
set at PhP 500 (US$11) 
per household per month 
(for a period of 12 
months/year) regardless 
of the number of 
children 
Education transfer is of 
PhP 300 (US$7) per 
month (for a period of 10 
months/year), up to a 
maximum of 3 children 
3 Piloting CCT in 
Egypt 
Egypt 2008 in Ain El 
Serra & should 
start in Upper 
Egypt by 2011  
approximately 
46,069 families 
were deemed 
eligible for 
application 
The cost of this 
program if 
applied in all 
villages and 
their appended 
rural units, 
would cost 
1888 million 
Government:  
financed by the 
MOSS and the 
research 
expenses 
activities by the 
Social Research 
Center (SRC) 
 Birth registration  
 Agree to receive a 
monthly social 
worker visit and 
cooperate 
 Children at age 5-
The amount suggested is 
244 EGP for each family 
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EGP yearly grants from 
UNICEF and 
another grant 
for MOSS by 
UNDP 
6 must enroll in 
primary school 
 Children between 
ages 6 and 15 who 
are enrolled in 
school must 
attend 85% of 
school days each 
month 
 Children who 
never enrolled 
but are too old to 
start primary 
school – enroll in 
remedial 
education  
 Obtain ration 
card, with help of 
social worker 
 All members of 
the family to 
attend preventive 
health visits 
according to 
MOHP protocol, 
including child 
growth 
monitoring, 
immunizations 
and deworming  
 Mothers to attend 
ANC, PNC and 
deliver in health 
facilities 
according to 
MOHP protocol 
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Conditional Cash Transfer in Egypt: What Can Constitute a good 
implementation controls? 
1.In your experience, which of the following measures have been used to discourage error, fraud, and corruption in CCT 
programs?
 Not used
Was used and 
was Highly 
effective
Was used and 
Somewhat 
effective
Was used with 
low level of 
effectiveness
Was used but 
not effective at 
all
Not sure/don’t 
know
Response 
Count
Training staff to ensure they have 
a clear understanding of what 
constitutes error, fraud, and 
corruption
9.1% (3) 54.5% (18) 15.2% (5) 3.0% (1) 0.0% (0) 18.2% (6) 33
Putting in place strong criminal 
penalties for fraudulent actions by 
program staff or beneficiaries
51.5% (17) 3.0% (1) 15.2% (5) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 30.3% (10) 33
Strengthening laws and regulations 
that govern punishment for fraud or 
corruption by beneficiaries
33.3% (11) 15.2% (5) 6.1% (2) 3.0% (1) 0.0% (0) 42.4% (14) 33
Strengthening laws and regulations 
that govern punishment for fraud or 
corruption by program officials
33.3% (11) 6.1% (2) 21.2% (7) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 39.4% (13) 33
Establish public awareness 
campaigns to ensure beneficiaries 
and community members 
understand how the program will 
deter fraud and corruption
9.1% (3) 57.6% (19) 15.2% (5) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 18.2% (6) 33
Use administrative penalties or 
2 of 2
formal cautions directed to clients 
who provide incorrect compliance 
information.
27.3% (9) 21.2% (7) 30.3% (10) 0.0% (0) 3.0% (1) 18.2% (6) 33
Use administrative penalties or 
formal cautions directed to school 
officials who provide incorrect 
compliance
39.4% (13) 9.1% (3) 15.2% (5) 0.0% (0) 3.0% (1) 33.3% (11) 33
 answered question 33
 skipped question 21
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Conditional Cash Transfer in Egypt: What Can Constitute a good 
implementation controls? 
2.In your experience, which of the following measures have been used to prevent error, fraud, and corruption at the 
eligibility stage? 
 Not used
Was used and 
was Highly 
effective
Was used and 
Somewhat 
effective
Was used with 
low level of 
effectiveness
Was used but 
not effective at 
all
Not sure/don’t 
know
Response 
Count
Design a stage of data collection 
process to identify cases
12.1% (4) 72.7% (24) 3.0% (1) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 12.1% (4) 33
Begin with a mapping of the 
community
12.1% (4) 66.7% (22) 12.1% (4) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 9.1% (3) 33
Involvement of civil society 
organizations in the program design 27.3% (9) 24.2% (8) 24.2% (8) 9.1% (3) 0.0% (0) 15.2% (5) 33
Use of IT systems in the 
verification of proves of eligibility 
against national databases
12.1% (4) 54.5% (18) 9.1% (3) 6.1% (2) 0.0% (0) 18.2% (6) 33
Training for program staff on 
mechanisms to prevent error, 
fraud, and corruption
15.2% (5) 48.5% (16) 15.2% (5) 3.0% (1) 0.0% (0) 18.2% (6) 33
 answered question 33
 skipped question 21
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Conditional Cash Transfer in Egypt: What Can Constitute a good 
implementation controls? 
3.In your experience, which of the following measures have been used to detect error, fraud, and corruption at the eligibility 
stage? 
 Not used
Was used and 
was Highly 
effective
Was used and 
Somewhat 
effective
Was used with 
low level of 
effectiveness
Was used but 
not effective at 
all
Not sure/don’t 
know
Response 
Count
Systems to facilitate data matching 
of the participant families across 
different data sources.
27.3% (9) 39.4% (13) 12.1% (4) 3.0% (1) 0.0% (0) 18.2% (6) 33
To focus eligibility checks on high-
risk groups 33.3% (11) 30.3% (10) 9.1% (3) 3.0% (1) 3.0% (1) 21.2% (7) 33
Recertify eligibility periodically to 
detect fraudulent actions
27.3% (9) 39.4% (13) 15.2% (5) 3.0% (1) 0.0% (0) 15.2% (5) 33
Make thorough cross-checks of 
registries to detect inconsistencies.
15.2% (5) 45.5% (15) 12.1% (4) 3.0% (1) 0.0% (0) 24.2% (8) 33
 answered question 33
 skipped question 21
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Conditional Cash Transfer in Egypt: What Can Constitute a good 
implementation controls? 
1.In your experience, which of the following measures have been used to prevent error, fraud, and corruption at the 
compliance stage?
 Not used
Was used and 
was Highly 
effective
Was used and 
Somewhat 
effective
Was used with 
low level of 
effectiveness
Was used but 
not effective at 
all
Not sure/don’t 
know
Response 
Count
Allocation of Government inter-
departmental responsibilities
21.9% (7) 25.0% (8) 21.9% (7) 3.1% (1) 3.1% (1) 25.0% (8) 32
Determine the nature of the 
problems facing families and 
support the family
15.6% (5) 46.9% (15) 18.8% (6) 3.1% (1) 0.0% (0) 15.6% (5) 32
Warning or punishing of families 
that bribe program officials to 
falsely confirm compliance with 
program conditionality
40.6% (13) 18.8% (6) 9.4% (3) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 31.3% (10) 32
Warning and punishing school 
officials who provide wrong 
compliance verification.
37.5% (12) 12.5% (4) 12.5% (4) 3.1% (1) 0.0% (0) 34.4% (11) 32
Warning and punishing health 
workers who provide wrong 
compliance verification
40.6% (13) 12.5% (4) 9.4% (3) 6.3% (2) 0.0% (0) 31.3% (10) 32
 answered question 32
 skipped question 22
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Conditional Cash Transfer in Egypt: What Can Constitute a good 
implementation controls? 
2.In your experience, which of the following measures have been used to detect error, fraud, and corruption at the 
compliance stage? 
 Not used
Was used and 
was Highly 
effective
Was used and 
Somewhat 
effective
Was used with 
low level of 
effectiveness
Was used but 
not effective at 
all
Not sure/don’t 
know
Response 
Count
Regular visits to schools to monitor 
children school attendance
15.6% (5) 53.1% (17) 15.6% (5) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 15.6% (5) 32
Regular visits to healthcare centers 
to monitor children & family health 
checkup records
15.6% (5) 46.9% (15) 18.8% (6) 3.1% (1) 0.0% (0) 15.6% (5) 32
Streamline of eligibility 
determination and related program 
rules to reduce level of ambiguity
12.5% (4) 53.1% (17) 12.5% (4) 3.1% (1) 0.0% (0) 18.8% (6) 32
Establish hotlines to receive 
complaints of families on non-
compliance issues
25.0% (8) 40.6% (13) 12.5% (4) 6.3% (2) 0.0% (0) 15.6% (5) 32
If families refuse to comply with 
conditions, a family will be 
excluded from the program
9.4% (3) 50.0% (16) 28.1% (9) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 12.5% (4) 32
Make regular visits by social 
workers to facilitate and encourage 
family compliance
31.3% (10) 46.9% (15) 6.3% (2) 0.0% (0) 3.1% (1) 12.5% (4) 32
Sample selections of cases for 
independent monitoring of 28.1% (9) 34.4% (11) 12.5% (4) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 25.0% (8) 32
2 of 2
outcomes to detect problems
Cross-check of compliance from 
supplier of service
15.6% (5) 34.4% (11) 15.6% (5) 6.3% (2) 0.0% (0) 28.1% (9) 32
 answered question 32
 skipped question 22
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Conditional Cash Transfer in Egypt: What Can Constitute a good 
implementation controls? 
1.In your experience, which of the following measures have been used to prevent error, fraud, and corruption at the cash 
disbursement stage?
 Not used
Was used and 
was Highly 
effective
Was used and 
Somewhat 
effective
Was used with 
low level of 
effectiveness
Was used but 
not effective at 
all
Not sure/don’t 
know
Response 
Count
Direct payment to program 
beneficiaries through direct bank 
deposits
21.9% (7) 65.6% (21) 6.3% (2) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 6.3% (2) 32
Regular checks by program 
administration on compliance 
before cash disbursing, rather than 
later in the process
40.6% (13) 40.6% (13) 6.3% (2) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 12.5% (4) 32
De-link cash payments from 
government and program staff
28.1% (9) 46.9% (15) 9.4% (3) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 15.6% (5) 32
 answered question 32
 skipped question 22
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Conditional Cash Transfer in Egypt: What Can Constitute a good 
implementation controls? 
2.In your experience, which of the following measures have been used to detect error, fraud, and corruption at the cash 
disbursement stage? ?
 Not used
Was used and 
was Highly 
effective
Was used and 
Somewhat 
effective
Was used with 
low level of 
effectiveness
Was used but 
not effective at 
all
Not sure/don’t 
know
Response 
Count
Review of benefit claims on 
randomly, or risk basis 34.4% (11) 25.0% (8) 12.5% (4) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 28.1% (9) 32
Monitor reports of ATM cards lost or 
stolen as a signal of possible fraud 46.9% (15) 12.5% (4) 9.4% (3) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 31.3% (10) 32
Collaborate to monitor cash flow by 
involving national and external audit 
units
28.1% (9) 31.3% (10) 12.5% (4) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 28.1% (9) 32
Use national IDs in verifying the 
payment process to match data of 
beneficiaries and improve detection 
efforts
12.5% (4) 56.3% (18) 6.3% (2) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 25.0% (8) 32
Reconcile payment transfers with 
actual payments on a regular basis
25.0% (8) 43.8% (14) 3.1% (1) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 28.1% (9) 32
Have national accounts audited by 
an external audit institution
25.0% (8) 40.6% (13) 6.3% (2) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 28.1% (9) 32
Monitor uncollected payments to 
gain information on the quality of 
controls and validate CCT cash 
payments
25.0% (8) 37.5% (12) 3.1% (1) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 34.4% (11) 32
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 answered question 32
 skipped question 22
